Restructuring the Debate over Fetal Homicide Laws by Ramsey, Carolyn B.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME 67, NUMBER 4,2006
Restructuring the Debate over
Fetal Homicide Laws
CAROLYN B. RAMSEY*
The worst problems with the fetal homicide laws that have proliferated
around the nation are quite different than the existing scholarship suggests.
Critics often argue that the statutes, which criminalize the killing of a fetus
by a third party other than an abortion provider, undermine a woman's
right to terminate her pregnancy. This concern is overstated Although
supported by anti-abortionists, many of the fetal homicide laws embody the
perspective of the so-called "abortion grays," who eschew the absolutism
of the doctrinaire pro-choice and anti-abortion camps. This Article explores
how a contextual view of life-taking allows us to reconcile legal abortion
with murder liability for the third-party killer of a fetus. Pro-choice
advocates ought to re-focus the abortion debate on the pregnant woman 's
defense of her bodily autonomy, rather than on the personhood or non-
personhood of the unborn. However, despite their basic compatibility with
women's rights, the fetal homicide laws, as drafted, do not offer a
satisfactory approach to the problem of pregnancy violence under
utilitarian or retributivist rationales. Extremely punitive measures may not
be successful in deterring intimate abuse. Even more troubling, the mens
rea provisions of many of the statutes fail to ensure fairness to defendants.
This Article seeks to spark a dialogue about fetal homicide and, more
generally, about violence against pregnant women that breaks free from the
polarized rhetoric of the abortion debate.
I. INTRODUCTION
The federal government and the majority of American states have
enacted laws that treat the killing of a fetus by someone other than the
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I A human develops in a series of stages, each associated with a different medical
term: zygote (at fertilization), blastocyte (at implantation), embryo (at about 2 weeks),
and fetus (from 8 weeks until birth). See H.R. REP. No. 108-420, pt. 1, at 83 (2004).
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pregnant woman or an abortion provider as a criminal homicide. 2 These
statutes seemingly pit the abortion right, which has been central to many
women's political and scholarly agendas, against another feminist concern-
that of preventing and punishing intimate abuse. However, contrary to the
predominant view in the academic literature, 3 this Article contends that there
is no unavoidable conflict between legal abortion and laws that criminalize
the killing of the unborn by a third party, such as an abusive spouse. The
deeper problem with the fetal homicide statutes, as currently drafted, is that
they fulfill neither the goal of effectively deterring assaults on pregnant
women, nor the imperative of upholding basic principles of justice for all
criminal defendants, including those accused of horrific, gender-based
violence.
The politics of the abortion debate have obscured the most serious
shortcomings of the statutes from a criminal law perspective. The insistence
of anti-abortionists that abortion is murder mirrors many pro-choice
advocates' determination to show that it is not homicide of any kind.4 These
polarized camps stake out territory within a landscape that makes fetal
However, for simplicity's sake this Article uses the word "fetus" to refer to all stages of
prenatal development.
2 See infra text accompanying notes 55-56 (discussing the proliferation of fetal
homicide statutes).
3 See infra text accompanying notes 17-24 (describing pro-choice opposition to the
fetal homicide laws).
4 The official Catholic position, for example, holds that abortion at any stage of
pregnancy is wrong because it constitutes the taking of innocent human life. See Daniel
Callahan, The Roman Catholic Position, in ABORTION: THE MORAL ISSUES 62, 63
(Edward Batchelor, Jr. ed., 1982). For a variety of anti-abortion views grounded in
religion and natural law, see generally Paul D. Simmons, Religious Approaches to
Abortion, in ABORTION, MEDICINE, AND THE LAW 712-28 (J. Douglas Butler & David F.
Walbert eds., 4th ed. 1992); see also N.E.H. HULL AND PETER CHARLES HOFFER, ROE V.
WADE: THE ABORTION RIGHTS CONTROVERSY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 8 (2001)
(describing the right-to-life credo to which Catholic and evangelical Christian opponents
of abortion subscribe). There is a significant amount of disagreement among (and even
within) religious faiths about the permissibility of abortion. See infra text accompanying
notes 38-39. Moreover, without any appeal to religion, individuals may reach polar
conclusions about whether killing a fetus amounts to the "wanton slaughter" of a full
human being. Lisa H. Newton, The Irrelevance of Religion in the Abortion Debate, in
ABORTION: THE MORAL ISSUES 3, 5. One medical argument favoring a woman's right to
terminate her pregnancy holds that, although the fertilized egg contains the DNA
information, it does not constitute a complete blueprint for an individual person. See
Charles A. Gardner, Is an Embryo a Person? in ABORTION, MEDICINE, AND THE LAW
453-56 (J. Douglas Butler & David F. Walbert eds., 4th ed. 1992) ("The embryo is not a
child. It is not a baby. It is not yet a human being."). Cf KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND
THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 174, 184 (1984) (contrasting pro-choice and anti-abortion
beliefs about the status of the fetus).
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personhood or non-personhood the high ground on which the abortion debate
supposedly will be lost or won.5 However, both anti-abortionists and their
pro-choice rivals exaggerate the ramifications for Roe v. Wade6 of declaring
fetus killing to be murder when it is perpetrated by a third party.
Fetal homicide statutes, which usually make exceptions for abortion and
other types of maternal liability, 7 do not sound the death knell for
reproductive rights. Although "pro-life"8 groups support these statutes as part
of their agenda of overturning Roe,9 the laws themselves are not uniformly
5 See LUKER, supra note 4, at 5-6 (suggesting that recognition of fetal personhood
would result in the re-criminalization of abortion); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections
on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1315 (1991) ("[Tlhe only point of
recognizing fetal personhood, or a separate fetal entity, is to assert the interests of the
fetus against the pregnant woman."); Lynn M. Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, Fetal
Persons, and the Threat to Roe v. Wade, 62 ALB. L. REV. 999, 1000 (1999) [hereinafter
Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users] ("If fetuses are recognized as full legal persons, then their
right to life must, as a matter of constitutional law, be protected-and all abortions
outlawed."); see also Katharine Folger, Note, When Does Life Begin or ... End? The
California Supreme Court Redefines Fetal Murder in People v. Davis, 29 U.S.F. L. REV.
237, 274 (1994) ("Terminating a pregnancy cannot be a constitutional right in one
situation and murder in another."); Tara Kole & Laura Kadetsky, The Unborn Victims of
Violence Act, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 215, 221 (2002) (stating that, according to critics of
fetal homicide laws, the recognition of fetal personhood will destroy the constitutional
foundation of reproductive rights). Outside academia, pro-choice activists have expressed
similar concerns about the rise of fetal personhood. For example, Gloria Feldt, President
of Planned Parenthood Federation of America, described the federal Unborn Victim's of
Violence Act as "part of a deceptive anti-choice strategy to make women's bodies mere
vessels by creating legal personhood for the fetus." Press Release, Planned Parenthood,
Senate Passes Dangerous Unborn Victims of Violence Act: S. 1019 Poses a Direct Threat
to Roe v. Wade (Mar. 25, 2004), available at
http://www.plannedparenthoodnj.org/library/files/97_uvvasenate.doc.
6 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
7 See infra text accompanying notes 55-56.
8 This Article sometimes uses the term "pro-life" to refer to individuals or groups
who oppose abortion. Such word choice does not indicate support for the views of anti-
abortionists, nor does it endorse the idea that anti-abortionists value life more than pro-
choice Americans do. Rather, the term "pro-life" is used because it is an appellation
commonly associated with opposition to abortion and because it allows for more varied
prose style.
9 At the state level, fetal homicide laws were sometimes passed as part of a
legislative package that included provisions placing restrictions on abortion. See, e.g.,
Press Release, Okla. H.R., Years of Work Lead to Landmark Pro-Life Legislation (June
10, 2005), available at www.lsb.state.ok.us/house/news7661 .html [hereinafter Okla. H.R.
Press Release]; Press Release, Governor of Miss., Miss. Governor's Message: Governor
Haley Barbour Caps Successful Pro-Life Agenda; Signs Four Bills (May 6, 2004) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Miss. Governor's Message]. The federal Unborn Victims of
Violence Act received support from several major anti-abortion groups. See Family
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hostile to that landmark decision. Indeed, the position embodied in many
criminal codes that feticide is murder in some circumstances and legal
abortion in others 10 balances a pregnant woman's right to make a choice that
affects her body and life in profound ways with the need to punish a third-
party killer who has no legitimate interest in causing the death of the fetus.
Analysis of fetal homicide statutes, and their implications for abortion
jurisprudence, shows that the absolutism of the anti-abortion and pro-choice
camps is out-of-step with the criminal law's nuanced approach to punishing
homicide, as well as with the views of a majority of Americans.
Proponents of legal abortion have much to lose by agreeing to conduct
the debate about reproductive rights within a framework that hinges on the
status of the fetus and thus sidelines the threat to the pregnant woman's
autonomy. The Supreme Court in Roe shaped the terms of the debate by
focusing on stages of physiological development and asserting that a fetus is
not a "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment."I Yet, many pro-choice
scholars too hastily concede that if the fetus is declared to be a person, the
battle is over, and Roe must be overruled. 12 Although dictum in Roe suggests
this line of reasoning, 13 it is an imprudent position to take in the face of
technology that suffuses our culture with human-like images of fetuses and
Members of Unborn Victims Go to Washington to Help Pass Bill, NAT'L RIGHT TO LIFE
NEWS (National Right to Life Committee, Washington, D.C.), Apr. 1, 2004, at 34,
available at 2004 WLNR 16784455 (stating that the National Right to Life Committee
urged families who lost fetuses in two-victim crimes to support the federal Unborn
Victims of Violence Act); see also Douglas Johnson, John Edwards Grows Deaf to the
Voices of Unborn Victims, NAT'L RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS (National Right to Life
Committee, Washington D.C.), Aug. 1, 2004, at 8, 10, available at 2004 WLNR
12599680 (claiming that unbom victims "will speak through pro-life citizens across the
nation"). See generally, e.g., United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Unborn
Victims of Violence Act, http://www.usccb.org/prolife/issues/abortion/victims.htm (last
visited Oct. 12, 2006) (documenting the support of the pro-life U.S. Conference of
Catholic Bishops for the Unborn Victims of Violence Act). Many of these groups
explicitly link their support for fetal homicide laws to their goal of getting Roe v. Wade
overturned. See KRON 4 News, Peterson Case Fuels Abortion Debate, KRON 4, May
27, 2003, http://www.kron.com/global/story.asp?s=1 296152&ClientType=Printable
("Pro-abortionists correctly point out that [the Unborn Victims of Violence Act is] really
another step toward eroding Roe v. Wade.").
10 See infra text accompanying notes 55-56.
11 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) ("[T]he word 'person,' as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.").
12 See, e.g., LUKER, supra note 4, at 5-6; Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, supra note
5, at 1000.
13 Roe, 410 U.S. at 157-58 n.54 (speculating that there could not be any exceptions
to the Texas abortion ban "if the fetus ... [were] a person who ... [was] not to be
deprived of life without due process of law").
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makes viability possible at increasingly early stages of fetal development.
The pro-choice camp would be better served by arguing that, although the
fetus may be a human being (or even a person in some legal contexts), the
choice to prevent it from being born still belongs to the woman, but not to
her attacker.
That said, the statutory schemes in question leave much to be desired. An
insidious problem with many fetal homicide laws, for example, inheres in
their treatment of mens rea. The statutes entrench an expansive view of
controversial doctrines like felony murder and transferred intent in cases
where the defendant may have been totally unaware of fetal life, rather than
culpably indifferent to it. 14 As a corollary, sentencing provisions often allow
the double counting of the fetus and the mother for the purposes of imposing
consecutive prison terms or the death penalty, although the prosecution has
shown neither intent to kill the fetus, nor even subjective awareness that the
mother was pregnant. 15 Thus, while the debate about fetal personhood
continues to rage, courts around the nation quietly affirm an approach to
homicide law that further erodes criminal intent (or at least extreme
indifference to life) as the touchstone of murder.
I present my argument in three parts. First, Part II juxtaposes the polar
views of the pro-choice and anti-abortion camps against the popularity of the
fetal homicide statutes with the majority of Americans, who also support
Roe. In addition, this Part offers a particularized examination of the myriad
state and federal laws governing fetal homicide. Contrary to many observers'
fears, these statutes do not provide an effective launching pad for an assault
on Roe. Instead, close analysis shows that many of them were drafted to
avoid conflict with abortion jurisprudence.
Second, Part III demonstrates the basic congruence between criminal law
norms and the popular belief that legal abortion is compatible with the
punishment of a third party for killing the unborn. This Part outlines the
social problem of violence against pregnant women, relates the sense of loss
that accompanies the nonconsensual termination of a desired pregnancy to
advances in medical technology, and argues that there is a legitimate state
interest in punishing some fetal deaths as murders. Exploring the contextual
nature of life-taking under the criminal law facilitates an understanding of
feticide that distinguishes a violent attack on a voluntary mother from a
pregnant woman's difficult decision to abort an unwanted fetus.
Finally, Part IV identifies serious shortcomings of the fetal homicide
statutes that have been eclipsed by the furor over fetal personhood. Chief
among them are the due process and proportionality concerns triggered by
the expansion of murder liability to cover in utero victims, as well as the
14 See infra Parts IV.B.2 & 3.
15 See infra notes 248-49 and accompanying text.
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dubious potential of such laws to deter violence against pregnant women.
The mens rea provisions of many fetal murder statutes are not only unfair to
defendants who did not know about the existence of the fetus; they also
stereotype female victims in an undesirable way. By making would-be
murderers run the risk that any female target might be pregnant, the statutes
label all women as incubators.
Implacable hostility to fetal rights in all contexts, including domestic
violence, ultimately may do more harm than good to the pro-choice agenda.
However, balance is important on the other side of the equation, as well.
Although third parties who knowingly kill the unborn without the consent of
the mother deserve severe sentences for their crimes, the objective of
punishing batterers and intimate killers must be constrained by dedication to
due process and proportionality for all criminal defendants.
II. PREGNANCY VIOLENCE AND THE ABORTION DEBATE
A. Polar Views of Fetal Personhood
Despite an emerging consensus that violence against pregnant women
constitutes a grave social problem, 16 feminist scholars and domestic-violence
policymakers have rejected fetal homicide statutes as a solution.' 7 These
16 See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Conceptualizing Violence Against Pregnant Women,
81 IND. L.J. 667, 670 (2006); see also infra notes 117-23, 288-98, and accompanying text
(describing the problem of pregnancy violence).
17 See Tuerkheimer, supra note 16, at 696-97, 709; Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users,
supra note 5, at 1014; see also Lisa McLennan Brown, Feminist Theory and the Erosion
of Women's Reproductive Rights: The Implications of Fetal Personhood Laws and In
Vitro Fertilization, 13 Am. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 87, 87 (2005) (asserting that
the propagation of fetal rights "is curtailing women's reproductive autonomy"); Amanda
K. Bruchs, Note, Clash of Competing Interests: Can the Unborn Victims of Violence Act
and Over Thirty Years of Settled Abortion Law Co-exist Peacefully?, 55 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 133, 136, 159 (2004) (contending that the federal Unborn Victims of Violence Act
conflicts with legal abortion); Kole & Kadetsky, supra note 5, at 216 (arguing that the
federal Act will "serve ultimately to undermine abortion rights"). But see Alison Tsao,
Note, Fetal Homicide Laws: Shield Against Domestic Violence or Sword to Pierce
Abortion Rights?, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 457, 480 (1998) (contending that fetal
homicide statutes do not necessarily undermine reproductive rights if the statutes
explicitly make exceptions for abortion). Battered women's advocates also opposed the
Unborn Victims of Violence Act. For example, Juley Ann Fulcher, Public Policy Director
of the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence ("NCADV"), testified against the
Act at a congressional hearing in 2003. See generally "The Unborn Victims of Violence
Act" or "Laci and Conner's Law": Hearing on H.R. 1997, Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 15-19 (2003), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/Hearings.aspx?ID=66 (Select "Hearing PDF (Serial No. 39)"
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criminal provisions are seen as contributing to the anti-abortionists' wider
campaign to make the fetus an autonomous entity with rights adversarial to
those of its mother-a campaign linked to concomitant changes in tort,
inheritance, and other laws.18 By endowing the unborn with a panoply of
legally cognizable interests from an early stage, the pro-life camp supposedly
will succeed in its coercive agenda toward the female sex. It will not only be
able to force women to bear unwanted children, but also to punish their
failure to provide an optimal uterine environment, free from alcohol,
nicotine, and drugs.' 9 Or so many pro-choice feminists fear.
Critics of the fetal homicide laws cite two bases for their concern that
criminal liability for fetus killing will result in the subordination of women
and the end of reproductive rights. First, in their view, the statutes participate
in the conservative Culture of Life, which unfairly casts ideological
opponents in the role of purveyors of death.20 This concern is heightened by
the fact that fetal homicide provisions have sometimes been lumped together
hyperlink) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 1997] (statement of Juley Ann Fulcher, Public
Policy Director, National Coalition Against Domestic Violence).
18 See Kenneth A. De Ville & Loretta M. Kopelman, Fetal Protection in
Wisconsin's Revised Child Abuse Law: Right Goal, Wrong Remedy, 27 J.L. MED. &
ETHIcs 332, 335 (1999) ("[O]ne facet of the longterm, end-game strategy of pro-life
forces has included an attempt to have fetuses declared 'children' or 'persons' in as many
legal contexts as possible, including child abuse laws, civil wrongful death actions, and
criminal homicide and assault statutes."); Jean Reith Schroedel, Pamela Fiber & Bruce D.
Snyder, Women's Rights and Fetal Personhood in Criminal Law, 7 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL'Y 89, 104-07 (2000) (alleging a similar strategy on the part of anti-abortionists); see
also Brown, supra note 17, at 87-88; Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, supra note 5, at
1000-01, 1009.
19 See Jean Reith Schroedel & Paul Peretz, A Gender Analysis of Policy Formation:
The Case of Fetal Abuse, 19 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 335, 349 (1994) (stating that
legal and medical authorities "have helped legitimate a causal story that attributes adverse
birth outcomes to women's lifestyle choices"). Cf Lynn Paltrow, 'Fetal Abuse': Should
We Recognize It as a Crime?, 75 A.B.A. J., Aug. 1989, at 38, 39 ("Recognizing 'fetal
abuse' moves us toward criminalizing pregnancy itself because no woman can provide a
perfect womb.").
20 See Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws: Legislating in the Culture of Life, 106
COLUM. L. REv. 753, 760-62, 785-87 (2006) (suggesting that Culture of Life proponents
subscribe to a belief system that links the abandonment of infants with abortion and even
with school shootings, such as the Columbine High School massacre in Colorado); see
also Bruchs, supra note 17, at 133-34 (noting the explicit self-identification of the Bush
administration with the Culture of Life). Cf Pope Attacks 'Culture of Death',
MSNBC.coM, Jan. 8, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10760901/ (describing an
official speech by Pope Benedict in which he criticized, in general terms, a "culture of
death" arising from irresponsible sex and the commodification of the body).
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with abortion-restrictive legislation, such as informed consent laws2 1 and
laws that give health-care providers the right not to perform medical
procedures that violate their consciences. 22 Second, the assertion of fetal
autonomy (and the related depiction of the pregnant woman as a mere
container for an independent person) has a long history associated with the
nineteenth-century criminalization of abortion.23 In the medical discourse of
the mid to late 1800s, physicians described the embryo as "embryonic man"
or as a suckling babe; but in both cases, they pursued the same goal: making
abortion illegal.24
Anti-abortion rhetoric in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries
continues to rely on the humanity or personhood of the fetus as the basis for
claiming that abortion is murder. However, whereas physicians spearheaded
the nineteenth-century campaign, 25 the current movement has a strong
religious tone. According to a number of modem faiths, abortion constitutes
the impermissible taking of innocent human life.2 6 In 1980, for example,
Pope John Paul II declared:
It is necessary to state firmly once more that nothing and no one can in any
way permit the killing of an innocent human being, whether a fetus or an
21 See Okla. H.R. Press Release, supra note 9 (describing a successful bi-partisan
effort to pass "landmark pro-life legislation" in Oklahoma).
22 See Miss. Governor's Message, supra note 9 (discussing "four pro-life bills,"
including a fetal homicide law, that the governor of Mississippi signed together).
23 See Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 288-92 (1992)
(discussing the strategic depiction of the embryo as an autonomous life form by anti-
abortion doctors in the nineteenth century). In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, of
course, doctors have tended to align with pro-choice forces. See HULL & HOFFER, supra
note 4, at 6 (remarking on physicians' changing role in the abortion debate).
24 See Siegel, supra note 23, at 289. Opponents of fetal homicide laws sometimes
rely on this history. See, e.g., Tuerkheimer, supra note 16, at 687 (citing Siegel's work to
argue that "[1]egal recognition of fetal rights can best be understood as a powerful
mechanism for enforcing societal notions of maternity and womanhood").
25 See JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF
NATIONAL POLICY, 1880-1900, at 147-70 (1978).
26 Simmons, supra note 4, at 713, 717-19, 721, 724 (describing the official views of
the Catholic, Southern Baptist, evangelical Christian, Orthodox, and Mormon churches,
as well as the Hindu faith). The official Roman Catholic position holds that the unborn
are infused with souls from conception, but also regards the proscription against abortion
as a matter of natural law. See id. at 713. Some other faiths stress the genetic uniqueness
of each human being as a reflection of God's image. See id. at 717 (discussing the views
of the Southern Baptist Convention). In contrast, Muslims believe that abortion should be
permitted during the first forty days of pregnancy, since the sayings of Muhammad
describe the fetus at that early stage as merely a "seed." Id. at 725.
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embryo, an infant or an adult, an old person, or one suffering from an
incurable disease, or a person who is dying. 2 7
While the Pope eloquently puts pen to paper, anti-abortion protestors wave
signs bearing graphic images of aborted late-term fetuses and employ other
shock tactics to make the same point.28
Given this background, pro-choice concern about fetal homicide laws is
understandable. There may be some danger that, even though the statutes do
not directly implicate Roe, they will contribute to the pro-lifers' cultural
message about the immorality of abortion.29 However, an absolutist reaction
that denies everything the statutes assert-that a fetus constitutes a human
life; that killing it is, in some contexts, criminally wrong; and that the murder
of a pregnant woman and the resultant death of her fetus amount to two
losses, rather than one-risks corroborating, in the public mind, the
allegation that pro-choicers espouse an extreme, anti-life position. Moreover,
this approach impedes holding wrongdoers, such as abusive spouses,
accountable for their actions. 30
B. The American Middle Ground
Fetal homicide laws enjoy widespread popular support. Opinion polls
indicate that the vast majority of American adults believe that someone who
attacks a pregnant woman should face additional charges for harming the
"unborn child."' 31 If the attack causes the death of the "unborn child," almost
27 Kevin D. O'Rourke, Physician Assisted Suicide, A Religious Perspective, 15 ST.
Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 433, 442 (1996) (quoting Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith, Vatican Declaration on Euthanasia, 10 ORIGINS 154-57 (1980)).
2 8 See ROSALIND POLLACK PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE: THE
STATE, SEXUALITY, AND REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 338-39 (rev. ed. 1990); see also
LINDA GORDON, THE MORAL PROPERTY OF WOMEN: A HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL
POLITICS IN AMERICA 309, 315 (3d ed. 2002) (describing similar tactics). Bishop Austin
Vaughn, a member of Operation Rescue who was jailed briefly for trespassing at abortion
clinics, compares himself to a clergyman confronting Hitler's concentration camps. In his
view: "[N]o Catholic can responsibly take a prochoice stand when the choice in question
involves the taking of innocent human life." Eileen McNamara, Taking Stock of the
Struggle: Abortion-An American Divide, reprinted in THE ABORTION RIGHTS
CONTROVERSY IN AMERICA: A LEGAL READER 237, 240 (N.E.H. Hull, Williamjames
Hoffer & Peter Charles Hoffer eds., 2004) (quoting Bishop Vaughn).
29 See Sanger, supra note 20, at 753, 760, 808.
30 See Marjorie M. Shultz, Abortion and Maternal-Fetal Conflict: Broadening Our
Concerns, I S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 79, 81-83 (1992).
31 Roper Ctr. for Pub. Opinion Research, Public Opinion Online, Gallup/CNN/USA
Today Poll, Question ID: USGallup.0lAPL20 R35 (Apr. 25, 2001), available at
LexisNexis, News Library, RPoll File (reporting that ninety-three percent of those polled
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eighty percent of those questioned in one poll answered that the perpetrator
should face separate murder charges. 32 Moreover, while public opinion
exhibits greater divisions over whether killing a pre-viable fetus constitutes
murder, the majority of those polled on this issue in 2003 favored murder
liability.33 Such data is subject to the usual limitations, including suggestive
or misleading questions and relatively small survey populations, 34 but it
nevertheless indicates an interesting pattern. The widely held view that third-
party killers of fetuses should suffer serious criminal penalties contrasts with
the public's enduring support for legal but limited access to abortion. 35 A
Pew Research Center analysis conducted in 2005 indicates that the American
public opposes overturning Roe by a ratio of two to one. 36 However, many
shared this view); see also H.R. REP. No. 108-420, pt. 1, at 5 (2004) (noting that "84% of
Americans believe that prosecutors should be able to bring a homicide charge on behalf
of an unborn child killed in the womb" by someone other than the pregnant woman or an
abortion provider).
32 Roper Ctr. for Pub. Opinion Research, Public Opinion Online, Fox News/Opinion
Dynamics Poll, Question ID: USODFOX.080103A R34 (Aug. 1, 2003), available at
LexisNexis, News Library, RPoll File.
33 Compare Roper Ctr. for Pub. Opinion Research, Public Opinion Online,
Newsweek Poll, Question ID: USPSRNEW.053103 R12 (May 31, 2003), available at
LexisNexis, News Library, RPoll File (fifty-six percent of those polled thought the killing
of a pregnant woman carrying a pre-viable fetus constituted murder), with Roper Ctr. for
Pub. Opinion Research, Public Opinion Online, Fox News/Opinion Dynamics Poll,
Question ID: USODFOX.080103A R35 (Aug. 1, 2003), available at LexisNexis, News
Library, RPolI File (seventy percent of those polled believed that the death of an eight-
month-old fetus due to an attack on a pregnant woman should be treated the same as the
death of a three-month-old fetus).
34 Note, for example, that many questions used the term "unborn child," which
strongly suggests human life or personhood, instead of "fetus," which does not.
Moreover, some survey questions implied that the Supreme Court's holdings assert an
absolute right to abortion. See, e.g., Roper Ctr. for Pub. Opinion Research, Public
Opinion Online, CBS News Poll, Question ID: USCBS.080405 R56 (Aug. 4, 2005),
available at LexisNexis, News Library, RPoll File (stating broadly that Roe "established
a constitutional right for women to obtain legal abortions"). All of the surveys cited
above targeted about a thousand people.
35 Public support for abortion preceded the Roe decision; seventeen states had
already decriminalized the procedure by 1973. GORDON, supra note 28, at 300; see HULL
& HOFFER, supra note 4, at 163 (noting that growing pro-choice sentiment preceded
Roe). Cf LUKER, supra note 4, at 225 (stating that pro-choice activism increased support
for legalized abortion between the 1960s and the 1970s). Opinion polls from the 1970s
through the present day show little fluctuation in aggregate attitudes toward abortion,
with a majority of Americans favoring legality. See GORDON, supra note 28, at 316-17.
36 See Press Release, Pew Research Center, Abortion, the Court, and the Public
(Oct. 3, 2005), available at http://www.pewtrusts.com/pdf/PRCabortion_ 1005.pdf; see
also Roper Ctr. for Pub. Opinion Research, Public Opinion Online, ABC News Poll,
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of those polled disfavor late-term abortions except in narrow circumstances
and support other restrictions, such as waiting periods and parental
notification. 37
Thus, although the warring camps depict a schism that supposedly
admits no compromise, surveys of American attitudes reveal discomfort with
absolutist thinking. Many Catholics hold more nuanced beliefs about the
morality and legality of abortion than does the National Council of Catholic
Bishops, which is dedicated to implementing the official pro-life position of
the church.38 Protestant groups also display varied opinions, including
opposition to state regulation on the basis of freedom of conscience and
support for terminating pregnancies in so-called hard cases.39 Whether
religious or not, ordinary Americans think in terms of context and
circumstance; they think in terms of exceptions.
The doctrinaire pro-choice agenda of the Democratic Party seems to
alienate twenty-first century voters who eschew the polar positions of
complete legality or illegality with regard to abortion. 40 Dubbed "abortion
grays" by think-tank strategists, 41 people occupying the middle ground
between the hardcore pro-choice and pro-life trenches want to set the bounds
of legality in different places. Although this Article does not endorse popular
views about exactly where the line should be drawn,42 it contends that the
Question ID: USABC.090605 R29 (Sept. 6, 2005), available at LexisNexis, News
Library, RPoll File (sixty percent of those polled want the Roberts Court to uphold Roe);
Roper Ctr. for Pub. Opinion Research, Public Opinion Online, CBS News Poll, Question
ID: USCBS.080405 R56 (Aug. 4, 2005), available at LexisNexis, News Library, RPoll
File (noting that sixty percent of those polled describe the Roe decision as a "good
thing"). Cf Poll: Majority Would Oppose Alito if He Would Overturn Roe, CNN.CoM,
Jan. 5, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/01/09/alito.poll/index.html (reporting
that fifty-six percent of those polled would not support the nomination of Samuel Alito to
the Supreme Court if they were convinced that he would overturn the landmark abortion
decision).
37 See Press Release, Pew Research Center, Abortion, the Court, and the Public,
supra note 36; see also Harris Poll (Mar. 3, 2005), (on file with author) (showing
substantially more than fifty percent of those polled believe that abortion should be legal
in the first trimesters, but not in the second and third trimesters).
38 See Simmons, supra note 4, at 716 (describing unofficial Catholic views).
39 See id at 716-22 (explaining the diversity of Protestant views).
40 See Debra Rosenberg, Roe's Army Reloads, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 8, 2005, at 24, 26-
27.
41 Id. at 27.
42 For example, polls in the 1980s indicated that many Americans then opposed
allowing abortions to facilitate women's educational or career advancement. See Siegel,
supra note 23, at 328 (citing a New York Times poll conducted in 1989). Another source
from that same decade also showed popular distaste for abortion due to financial inability
to raise the child. See Roper Ctr. for Pub. Opinion Research, Public Opinion Online,
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public is correct to take a contextual view of homicide and to recognize that
abortion does not equate to fetal murder.
Legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin characterizes the views of "abortion
grays" as incoherent and even disingenuous. 43 Criticizing anti-abortionists
who nevertheless recognize narrow exceptions to their desired abortion ban,
for example, he contends, "It is a very common view.., that abortion should
be permitted when necessary to save to the mother's life. Yet this exception
is also inconsistent with any belief that a fetus is a person with a right to
live."44 Dworkin also implicitly rejects or denies the existence of a liberal
"gray" belief that abortion should be mostly legal, even though the fetus has
some protectable interest in life.45 In Dworkin's eyes, it is impossible
simultaneously to believe that abortion constitutes life-taking and also that in
certain (or even most) circumstances, it should remain a pregnant woman's
choice. Nevertheless, the poll data cited above indicates that is precisely what
the majority of Americans believe.46 Furthermore, many people apparently
see no inconsistency between the delicate balance struck by the Supreme
Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey4 7 and the conviction, and even capital
punishment, of an individual who causes the death of a fetus by attacking its
mother.48
Yankelovich, Skelly, & White Poll, Question ID: USYANK.818348 R06AF (Sept. 18,
1981 - Sept. 25, 1981), available at LexisNexis, News Library, RPoll File (reporting that
seventy-nine percent of respondents thought it should be illegal for a welfare mother who
could not work to terminate her pregnancy).
43 See RONALD DwORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 30-35 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1993).
44 Id. at 32.
45 See id. at 34.
46 See supra text accompanying notes 31-37.
47 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992) (establishing
undue burden standard and affirming Roe, but criticizing the 1973 decision for
undervaluing the State's interest in potential life).
48 The federal Unborn Victims of Violence Act ("UVVA") was renamed "Laci and
Conner's Law" in honor of a woman and fetus killed by the woman's husband, Scott
Peterson. H.R. REP. No. 108-420, pt. 1, at 2 (2004). Laci's mother, Sharon Rocha,
became a staunch supporter of legislation treating fetuses as separate victims of murder.
In a public statement, Rocha attempted to persuade pro-choice Americans to support her
cause, based on her apparently sincere conviction that such laws do not conflict with
reproductive rights: "I fear that some senators have opposed Laci and Conner's law [i.e.
the UVVA] because of misunderstandings. Laci and Conner's law has nothing to do with
abortion." Press Release, Remarks Delivered by Mrs. Sharon Rocha, Mother of Laci
Peterson on the Passage of "Laci and Conner's Law," Mar. 3, 2004,
http://majoritywhip.house.gov/ (select News hyperlink; then scroll through News
Releases to find Rocha's Mar. 3, 2004, remarks).
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C. Fetal Homicide Laws and the "Abortion Grays "
Despite the gloss they are given in the fiery rhetoric of the abortion
debate, the fetal homicide statutes are surprisingly diverse. State legislatures
passed many of them after the onset of the twenty-first century, but some
have a long history. For example, California's amended Penal Code § 187
preceded Roe.49 In 1970, the California Senate and Assembly voted almost
unanimously to add fetal victims to the murder statute.50 The amendment
was passed in reaction to a judicial opinion that precluded the murder
prosecution of a man who intentionally beat and kicked his pregnant wife,
killing her eight-month-old fetus.51 In 1970, the California Code already
legalized therapeutic abortions, and the bill specifically exempted such
procedures from its definition of murder.52 There is no evidence that a desire
to curtail reproductive rights had any bearing on the California amendment.
In contrast, crime-control aims seem to be intertwined with pro-life activism
in the passage of fetal homicide statutes within the past few years. Some
states, such as Oklahoma, enacted these laws along with a bundle of abortion
regulations. 53
However, rather than rejecting the fetal homicide statutes out of hand due
to their suspect genesis, it is preferable to analyze them closely to see if they
provide an opportunity for pro-choice advocates to present a moderate face to
49 CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (1999).
50 See Enrolled Bill Memorandum to Governor of California re: Assembly Bill 816,
Sept. 1970 (on file with the author).
51 See Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970). Keeler kicked his
estranged wife in the abdomen with openly declared intent to kill the fetus. See id at 618.
However, as a result of the California Supreme Court's ruling, Keeler could not be
convicted of anything more serious than assault; see also text accompanying notes 294-
95.
52 See Draft Assembly Bill 816, California Legislature, Regular Session, Feb. 1970
(on file with the author).
53 See Press Release, Okla. S., Lawler Praises Senate Panel for Passage of House
Bill 1686 (Apr. 7, 2005), http://oksenate.gov (follow News hyperlink; then follow Press
Releases hyperlink; then follow 2005 Senate Press Releases hyperlink; then follow April
hyperlink; then follow Lawler Praises Senate Panel for Passage of House Bill 1686
hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 12, 2006). This Oklahoma Senate news release melds
enthusiasm for informed consent laws with references to the sensational murder of a
young pregnant woman, Laci Peterson, in California. Referring to the headline-grabbing
California case, Oklahoma Senator Daisy Lawler, a pro-life Democrat, was quoted as
saying: "We all watched the tragic events surrounding the death of Laci Peterson and her
unborn child, Connor [sic] .... Making criminals pay for taking the life of a mother and
her unborn child is commonsense legislation." Id.
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"gray" voters. 54 This analysis shows that, despite receiving support from
hardcore anti-abortion groups, many of the laws track the middle ground of
public opinion, and the contextual approach to life-taking that they codify
poses no serious threat to Roe.
1. Abortion and Maternal Liability Exceptions
The views reflected in poll data-those of the "abortion grays"-accord
with the fetal homicide laws that Congress and legislatures across the nation
have enacted. As of 2005, at least thirty-three states criminalized the killing
of a fetus under regular homicide statutes, separate feticide laws, or judicial
interpretations of the criminal code. Legislatures, rather than courts, have
made most of the law in this area.
About seventy percent of the statutes explicitly contain an abortion
exception, and more than half do not impose criminal liability on pregnant
women for any harm they cause their fetuses. 55 The federal Unborn Victims
of Violence Act ("UVVA") also exempts both pregnant women and abortion
providers from prosecution. 56 As we shall see, such exemptions call into
question claims that the laws adopt a coercive stance toward women.
States that have chosen to exclude the mother from liability under their
fetal homicide statutes follow a nationwide trend toward disallowing the
criminal prosecution of pregnant women for causing prenatal injury.57 In the
1980s and 1990s, a spate of articles sounded the alarm about governmental
efforts to control the behavior of pregnant drug users--especially ethnic
minorities and the poor-by holding them criminally accountable, under
54 Although Kristen Luker might not share my view that it is impolitic for pro-
choice activists to mount a strident campaign against fetal homicide laws, she did predict
that "the future of the debate will belong to the side that most effectively captures the
middle ground of opinion." LUKER, supra note 4, at 228.
55 Database maintained by the author.
56 18 U.S.C.S. § 1841 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006).
57 See David C. Brody & Heidee McMillin, Combating Fetal Substance Abuse and
Governmental Foolhardiness Through Collaborative Linkages, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and Common Sense: Helping Women Help Themselves, 12 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 243, 249 (2001); see also State v. Deborah J. Z., 596 N.W.2d 490, 494 n.5
(Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (indicating that only one state court of last appeal has held that
maternal drug use during pregnancy can result in criminal prosecution and conviction).
However, while most states now reject criminal law approaches, several have established
avenues to involuntary civil confinement that might be considered sex-biased and
offensive to principles of bodily autonomy. See generally De Ville & Kopelman, supra
note 18 (criticizing amendments to Wisconsin's child protection laws affecting pregnant
substance abusers); see also Brody & McMillin, supra, at 248-49 (discussing the greater
success of civil confinement schemes, compared to criminal prosecutions, in such states
as Minnesota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin).
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existing child abuse and drug distribution laws, for exposing the unborn to
illegal substances. 58 Observers warned of a link between fetal abuse
prosecutions and "the beginning of the conservative pro-life movement's
shift in strategy from a focus on opposing abortion to ... [embracing] fetal
rights." 59 However, with the exception of Whitner v. State 60 and its progeny
in South Carolina,61 courts generally have reversed pregnant drug users'
convictions. 62 Due in part to the efforts of the ACLU and other amici, judges
were persuaded that the criminal law approach to the "crack baby" problem
might lead to disaster. Courts feared opening the floodgates to the
prosecution of expectant mothers whose conduct ranged from smoking
cigarettes, drinking alcohol, or driving their cars negligently to eating too
much junk food.63 Judges also worried that prosecuting pregnant substance
58 For example, in 1999, Lynn Paltrow expressed concern that prosecutors were
disproportionately targeting low-income women of color for cocaine use during
pregnancy, although minority women are not the only drug users and prenatal cocaine
exposure arguably poses lower risks to the fetus than maternal alcohol and nicotine use.
See Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, supra note 5, at 1019-24; see also Note, Maternal
Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the Criminalization of "Fetal Abuse, " 101
HARV. L. REV. 994, 1009-11 (1988) (criticizing fetal abuse prosecutions and instead
advocating education and funding related to prenatal care); Schroedel & Peretz, supra
note 19, at 349 ("Out of a desire to coerce pregnant women into avoiding behaviors that
might harm the fetus, prosecutors stretch child abuse laws to include the fetal exposure to
drugs and alcohol while in utero.").
59 Bryony J. Gagan, Note, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, South Carolina: "Fetal
Abuse, '" Drug Testing, and the Fourth Amendment, 53 STAN. L. REv. 491,495 (2000).
60 Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 780 (S.C. 1997) (upholding a female
defendant's conviction for criminal child neglect for ingesting cocaine during third
trimester on grounds that it would be inconsistent to consider a fetus a "person" under
homicide and wrongful death statutes but not under child abuse laws).
61 The Whitner decision continues to be influential in South Carolina. See, e.g., State
v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168, 173-74 (S.C. 2003) (citing Whitner to uphold homicide
conviction and twenty-year prison term for a drug user who gave birth to a stillborn
baby). However, the United States Supreme Court has struck down other aspects of the
campaign against pregnant substance abusers in this southern state. In Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84 (2001), the Court held that Charleston's warrantless,
nonconsensual drug-testing of pregnant women violated the Fourth Amendment.
62 See State v. Aiwohi, 123 P.3d 1210, 1218 (Haw. 2005) (noting that "Whitner
appears to contradict the trend of decisions issued by other jurisdictions"); see also State
v. Dunn, 916 P.2d 952, 955 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996); Commonwealth v. Welch, 864
S.W.2d 280, 281-82 (Ky. 1993); State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32, 34 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992);
State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140, 1142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Jackson v. State, 833
S.W.2d 220, 223 (Tex. App. 1992).
63 See, e.g., Reinesto v. Superior Court, 894 P.2d 733, 736 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995)
(noting that "[m]any types of prenatal conduct can harm a fetus, causing physical or
mental abnormalities in a newborn"); Sheriff of Washoe County v. Encoe, 885 P.2d 596,
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abusers would cause them to shun prenatal care or drug treatment 64 and that
incarcerating them "would needlessly destroy the family. '65 Hence, while a
sound argument could be made that a woman assumes responsibility for her
fetus when she decides not to have an abortion,66 criminal punishment for her
chemical dependency, carelessness, or ignorance has appeared unwise and
counter-productive to many observers.
Indeed, despite ordinary Americans' disapproval of crack-addicted
mothers, 67 the appellate bench is not alone in its resistance to convictions
based on maternal liability for fetal harm. Efforts to criminalize prenatal
substance abuse by passing new statutes have met little success in state
legislatures. 68 Uncertainty about whether the fetus could be considered either
a "child" or a "person" led many judges to reverse convictions in the
1990s, 69 but subsequently-enacted fetal homicide laws continued the trend
against prosecuting pregnant women by expressly including exceptions for
maternal liability.70 Many states have exempted expectant mothers from
prosecution, even after clarifying that their criminal codes cover fetal injury
or death.
598 (Nev. 1994) (opining that the prosecution of pregnant women for consuming harmful
substances could lead to criminal charges against expectant mothers "who ingest such
things as alcohol, nicotine, and a range of miscellaneous, otherwise legal, toxins").
64 See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1294 (Fla. 1992) (expressing this
view).
65 Gethers, 585 So. 2d at 1143 (quoting Brian C. Spitzer, Comment, A Response to
"Cocaine Babies "--Amendment of Florida's Child Abuse and Neglect Laws to
Encompass Infants Born Drug Dependent, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 865, 881 (1987)).
66 See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Beyond Dworkin's Dominions: Investments,
Memberships, the Tree of Life, and the Abortion Question, 72 TEx. L. REv. 559, 609
(1994) (book review) (arguing that once a woman decides to carry her future child to
term, she must abstain from smoking and drinking); Moses Cook, Note, From
Conception Until Birth: Exploring the Maternal Duty to Protect Fetal Health, 80 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1307, 1339 (2002) (making a similar argument).
67 See, e.g., Schroedel, Fiber & Snyder, supra note 18, at 102 (citing various media
reports on poll results relevant to this issue).
68 See, e.g., Encoe, 885 P.2d at 599 (discussing how a bill to provide statutory
authority for such prosecutions died in committee); State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32, 35
(Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that the legislature defeated two bills that would have
amended Georgia law to create a new crime for distributing controlled substances to
unborn children); Gethers, 585 So. 2d at 1142 (noting various unsuccessful attempts to
criminalize giving birth to a drug-addicted infant).
69 See, e.g., State v. Dunn, 916 P.2d 952, 955 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996);
Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280, 281-82 (Ky. 1993); Luster, 419 S.E.2d at 34.
70 See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507A.010(3) (West 2005).
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In short, the fear that Whitner signaled a sea change toward the punitive
treatment of pregnant women 71 has not become a reality. If the abortion and
maternal liability exceptions to fetal homicide laws provide a valid
indication, commentators overstate the danger that these statutes will be used
directly to control women's bodies and behavior.72 Furthermore, the
prosecution of men who kill or otherwise harm in utero victims arguably
addresses a perceived sexist focus on destructive maternal conduct. 73
2. Is a Fetus a "Person " Under the Fetal Homicide Laws?
The statutes also do not provide clear evidence that the unborn are
ubiquitously becoming "persons" under law. More than sixty percent of
states with fetal homicide laws eschew designating the fetus as a "person,"
instead calling it a "human being" 74 or seeking to avoid the personhood issue
altogether by making feticide a separate crime from murder and
manslaughter. 75 Maryland counts a viable fetus as a "victim" but expressly
provides, "Nothing in this section [defining murder and manslaughter] shall
be construed to confer personhood or any rights on the fetus." 76 This
language came from an amendment "apparently intended to provide
additional assurance that the bill [would] not be used to erode the rights to
71 Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, supra note 5, at 1008-09. Through her tireless
work for the ACLU and other organizations that submitted amicus briefs, Paltrow helped
defeat the prosecutorial approach.
72 For example, in her thoughtful article on pregnancy battering, Deborah
Tuerkheimer mistakenly reports that "most state law analogues" to the federal UVVA do
not contain a maternal liability exception. Tuerkheimer, supra note 16, at 696 n. 154. In
fact, about eighteen of thirty-three states that criminalize the killing of a fetus explicitly
exempt pregnant women from such prosecutions in other contexts besides abortion. This
data is contained in a database maintained by the author.
73 See Schroedel, Fiber & Snyder, supra note 18, at 111 (contrasting "the state's
disinterest when male actions harm or potentially harm the fetus with its aggressive
stance toward similarly situated women"); see also id. at 112, 117. These authors err in
seeing a pregnant woman and a third-party attacker as "similarly situated," however. See
infra Parts III.C & III.D (contending that there is a vital difference between the two).
74 Idaho and Mississippi are among the states that use this term. See IDAHO CODE
ANN. §§ 18-4001, 18-4006, 18-4016 (2004) (human in utero); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-
37 (West 2005).
75 States taking this approach include Illinois, Michigan, and North Dakota. See 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1.2, 5/9-2.1, 5/9-3.2 (West 2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.322 (West 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-17.1-01-12.1-17.1-06 (1997).
76 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-103(g) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005).
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abortion ... or rights of maternal autonomy. ' 77 California and Indiana
include fetal killing in their regular murder and manslaughter statutes, but
establish the fetus as a distinct entity from live-born humans by referring to
the "unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus."'78
The difference between human beings and persons constitutes more than
formalistic hairsplitting. While a fetus developing within a woman's body
seems indisputably human (as opposed to canine, bovine, etc.), it may lack
attributes often associated with personhood, such as consciousness, reason,
feelings experienced in relation to others, and the ability to communicate.79
Although it is part of a life process, it arguably is not a full person in a social
sense. This understanding of personhood contrasts with the official beliefs of
several major religions that the growing organism possesses a soul, or is
genetically perfect, from the moment of conception. 80 Some states that avoid
the term "person" in describing fetal victims genuinely may embrace the
more secular of these two positions-and the one that involves the least
tension with the Supreme Court's terminology. Others probably seek
conformity with abortion law for the purely pragmatic goal of surviving a
constitutional challenge.
Furthermore, even when interpreting statutes that use the phrase "unborn
child," courts have not found clear intent to confer personhood. A
Pennsylvania court opined, for example:
To have life, as that term is commonly understood, means to have the
property of all living things to grow, to become. It is not necessary to prove,
nor does the [Pennsylvania fetal homicide] statute [protecting the "unborn
child" from "fertilization until live birth"] require, that the living organism
in the womb in its embryonic or fetal state be considered a person or a
77 Letter from Kathryn M. Rowe, Assist. Att'y Gen. of Maryland, to the Honorable
Charles R. Boutin (Feb. 17, 2005) (on file with author).
78 CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1999) (emphasis added). See IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-42-1-1(4) (West 2004) (establishing murder liability for a person who "knowingly
or intentionally kills a fetus that has attained viability").
79 A bitter debate revolves around the question of when a fetus can feel pain. A team
of medical researchers who recently hypothesized that fetuses do not feel pain until the
third trimester has butted heads with anti-abortionists, who want laws requiring abortion
providers to give fetal pain information to patients in the twentieth week of pregnancy.
Fetal Pain Challenged by Scientific Review, CNN.CoM, Aug. 23, 2005 (on file with
author). In January 2006, Wisconsin Governor Jim Doyle vetoed a bill requiring abortion
providers to tell women that their five-month-old fetuses could suffer pain. See Wisconsin
Governor Vetoes Abortion Bill, CNN.coM, Jan. 7, 2006 (on file with author). The U.S.
House of Representatives considered similar legislation in the autumn of 2005. See
Arthur Caplan, Abortion Politics Twist Facts in Fetal Pain Laws, MSNBC.CoM, Nov. 30,
2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10238840/ (criticizing the proposed bill).
80 PETCHESKY, supra note 28, at 348.
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human being. People are free to differ or abstain on the profound
philosophical and moral questions of whether an embryo is a human being,
or on whether or at what stage the embryo or fetus is ensouled or acquires
"personhood". These questions are entirely irrelevant to criminal liability
under the statute. 8 1
3. Ignoring the Viability Threshold
It is worth highlighting one area in which Congress and many state
courts and legislatures have departed from the framework established by the
Supreme Court in Roe.82 A large minority of states reject viability-"the
time at which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a
life outside the womb" 83-as the earliest point that a criminal homicide can
occur. This is often a matter of statutory law, but in at least eight states, the
judiciary has determined the stage at which a human can be murdered.84
Whereas eighteen states continue to follow the common-law "born alive"
requirement for murder, 85 another eighteen now place the onset of criminal
liability for killing the unborn at conception.8 6 In keeping with this trend, the
UVVA protects the "unborn child"-defined as a "child in utero ... at any
state of development, who is carried in the womb. '87 Two states specify the
stage at which an embryo becomes a fetus,88 and three use the historical term
81 Commonwealth v. Bullock, 868 A.2d 516, 523 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (citation
omitted).
82 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973) (establishing a trimester
framework under which abortion would be legal during the first trimester; restricted on
grounds related to maternal health in the second trimester; and restricted due to the state's
interest in the potentiality of human life only after viability, with exceptions to preserve
the woman's life or health).
83 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992).
84 People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 599 (Cal. 1994) (seven to eight weeks); State v.
Anon., 516 A.2d 156, 158 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986) (born alive); State v. Trudell, 755
P.2d 511, 513 (Kan. 1988) (born alive); Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 536 N.E.2d 571,
575-76 (Mass. 1989) (viability); In re A. W. S., 440 A.2d 1144, 1145 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1981) (born alive); State v. Beale, 376 S.E.2d 1, 4 (N.C. 1989) (born alive);
State v. Home, 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (S.C. 1984) (viability); State v. Oliver, 563 A.2d
1002, 1003-04 (Vt. 1989) (born alive).
85 Database maintained by the author.
86 Database maintained by the author.
87 18 U.S.C.S. § 1841(d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006) (emphasis added).
88 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32.2 (2004) (creating a separate homicide crime in
Virginia for the "killing of a fetus"); Davis, 872 P.2d at 599 (holding that California's
murder statute applies to any unborn, human offspring at least seven or eight weeks after
fertilization, regardless of viability).
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"quickening," which refers to the moment when the pregnant woman first
perceives fetal movement (usually at about sixteen to eighteen weeks).89
Interestingly, only eight states use viability, the critical juncture that the
Supreme Court identified in the abortion context. Thus, in addressing fetal
homicide by a third party, many elected representatives have ignored the
physiological threshold that the Court established for determining when "the
independent existence of. .. [fetal] life can in reason and all fairness be the
[overriding] object of state protection."90
Nevertheless, the federal government and the twenty-four states that
punish fetal homicide prior to viability cannot be accused of waging a frontal
assault on abortion jurisprudence. Fetal homicide laws in these jurisdictions
do not actually upset the status quo. After Roe, the Supreme Court itself
decided that the government's interest in potential life precedes viability,
although at earlier stages of fetal development, the woman's interests in
privacy and autonomy predominate. 91 Explaining its abrogation of the
trimester framework, the Court in Casey criticized Roe's "rigid prohibition
on all previability regulation aimed at the protection of fetal life. ' '92 Legal
concern for the well-being of pre-viable fetuses harmonizes with
contemporary Supreme Court holdings, as well as with the beliefs of
Americans occupying the ideological middle ground.93
Moreover, the viability line primarily has significance for balancing a
pregnant woman's privacy and autonomy against the state's interest in
potential life. When the law criminalizes the lethal conduct of a third-party
attacker, there are no competing interests to weigh.94 As we shall see,
evidence about the stage of fetal development helps to clarify causation
issues and to suggest whether the defendant was aware of the pregnancy.95
But despite its relevance to determining the cause of death or the criminal
defendant's mens rea, viability has no talismanic significance outside of
abortion law.
89 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80(a) (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.2 10
(LexisNexis 2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.060(l)(b) (West 2000).
90 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992).
91 Id. at 860, 873.
9 2 Id. at 873.
93 See supra text accompanying notes 31-33 (noting public support for punishing
third-party killers of early-term fetuses).
94 See infra Parts III.C & III.D (discussing the distinction between third-party
criminal liability and a woman's right qualified right to abortion under current law).
95 See infra Part IV.C (discussing criminal knowledge and causation).
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4. Anti-Abortion Outliers
The criminal codes of some states do announce a hostile view of
abortion; they essentially set up "trigger" laws that will immediately
criminalize the procedure if the Court overturns Roe. For example,
Missouri's statutory scheme defines an "unborn child" as a "person" for the
purposes of homicide, imposes severe penalties, including death, and does
not contain an explicit exception for abortion.96 Judge-made law achieves
similar results in other states, such as South Carolina.
9 7
Missouri has a long history of challenging reproductive rights with
regulations that conflict with the Court's holdings.98 Hence, it comes as no
surprise that this state includes fetus killing in its general murder and
manslaughter statutes without explicitly creating an abortion exception.
99
The preamble of the Missouri criminal code states:
The life of each human being begins at conception ... Unborn children
have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being ... [and] the laws
of this state shall be interpreted and construed to acknowledge on behalf of
the unborn child at every stage of development, all the rights, privileges,
and immunities available to other persons, citizens, and residents of this
state, subject only to the Constitution of the United States, and decisional
interpretations thereof by the United States Supreme Court .... 100
This preamble seems to invite the Court to overturn Roe; yet, in Webster
v. Reproductive Health Services,10 1 a plurality of justices nonetheless
96 Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 1.205, 565.020 (West 2000).
97 See State v. Home, 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (S.C. 1984) (holding that a viable fetus is
a "person" for the purposes of criminal homicide); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-10-16-3-60
(2003).
98 See Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 53 (1976)
(declaring spousal consent and parental consent requirements to be unconstitutional);
Danforth v. Rodgers, 414 U.S. 1035 (1973) (invalidating statutes criminalizing abortions
except in cases where the pregnant woman's life was endangered).
99 See Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 565.020-565.025 (West 2000). Interestingly, Missouri's
homicide provisions do contain an exception for the woman's failure to get proper
prenatal care or otherwise follow a sound health regimen during pregnancy. See Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 1.205 (West 2000). By contrast, South Carolina is also an outlier in its
punitive treatment of pregnant drug users. See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text
(contrasting South Carolina's harsh policies and case law with more moderate approaches
in other states).
100 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205(l)-(2) (West 2000).
101 Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (plurality).
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declared it to be merely precatory. 10 2 The Webster plurality opinion further
explained that states enjoy latitude to express value judgments favoring
childbirth over abortion, as long as they do not impose impermissible
regulations on a woman's choice or a doctor's medical practice. 10 3
Webster was a controversial decision. In upholding Missouri's ban on the
use of public employees and facilities for non-therapeutic abortions, it
insisted on a troubling flip-side of autonomy from government interference-
the inability to count on the state for help. 104 Webster and the abortion
funding cases 105 seemed to take away the necessary preconditions for self-
determination for many pregnant women, especially the poor. 10 6 But the
Webster plurality opinion still has the power to moderate the fetal homicide
debate in a constructive way. In Roe, the Court declined to impose its own
view of when life begins. 10 7 Webster subsequently indicated that this
question could be left to the democratic process, as long as the woman's right
to terminate her pregnancy was not thereby overridden. 108 The case thus
102 Id. at 505-07; see also id. at 523 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (opining that the
possible uses of the preamble to restrict abortion, contraception, or in vitro fertilization
were "too hypothetical to support the use of declaratory judgment procedures and
injunctive remedies").
103 Id. at 506 (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).
104 See id at 507 (upholding the challenged provisions of the Missouri statute on the
grounds that the Due Process clause confers "no affirmative right to governmental aid,
even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests.")
(quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196
(1989)).
105 See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). Some
scholars who have criticized the line of cases from Maher to Rust believe that they "are
not a failure of privacy jurisprudence, but rather a failure to take privacy seriously."
Linda C. McClain, The Poverty of Privacy?, 3 CoLUM. J. GENDER & L. 119, 138 (1992).
Privacy does not have to be understood simply as noninterference; it could also be
interpreted as a positive obligation of government to protect the autonomy and self-
determination of the individual. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 15-2 (1st ed. 1978); see also Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23
CONN. L. REV. 973, 996 (1991) ("In Roe, [Justice] Douglas expressed a vision of a
privacy right as something far more tied to an affirmative concept of liberty than a right
to be left alone .... ).
106 Cf Pamela S. Karlan & Daniel R. Ortiz, In a Diffident Voice: Relational
Feminism, Abortion Rights, and the Feminist Legal Agenda, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 858, 879
n. 115 (1993) (discussing the abortion funding cases).
107 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159-160 (1973).
108 See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 506 (1989) (plurality).
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establishes that the recognition of fetal personhood outside the parameters of
the Constitution does not automatically conflict with the abortion right. 109
To summarize: While critics of fetal homicide laws often depict them as
a monolithic threat to reproductive freedom, l 1° this broad-brush approach is
more polemical than informative. In their diversity, American states have
approached fetal homicide in ways that track available poll data, with the
majority making it clear that their laws do not directly impinge on a woman's
right to terminate her pregnancy or punish her lifestyle if she chooses to carry
her fetus to term. The drafting of the outliers hints at the strength of a vocal
minority-the twenty-nine percent of Americans who would like to see Roe
overturned 1 However, failing to perceive key differences between
implacable anti-abortionists and the "grays," who support Roe but still accord
the fetus some degree of humanity, could be a costly political mistake for the
pro-choice camp to make. Since Webster and Casey, democratically elected
legislatures have enjoyed significant authority over the details of abortion
regulation. 112 Proponents of reproductive freedom thus need to speak a
language that has moderate appeal.
III. LIFE-TAKING IN CONTEXT
In contrast to a pro-choice agenda that completely denies fetal
personhood, a contextual approach to life-taking allows us to reconcile the
position of a voluntary mother whose fetus is killed with that of a woman
who wants an abortion. The first woman and her family experience the
109 Courts have also rejected claims that fetal homicide laws which presume to
identify the beginning of life at conception, or in the embryonic stage, violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. "The imposition of criminal liability is
generally a secular matter .... " State v. Bauer, 471 N.W.2d 363, 365 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991). The crimes of murder and manslaughter inevitably require a determination of
whether human tissue is alive or dead. Thus, even if the fetal homicide statutes stem in
part from religious beliefs, they still may satisfy the secular purpose test. See id. at 365.
Indeed, courts have expressed a preference for legislative determinations of such deeply
controversial matters. See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 625 (Cal. 1970)
("Whether to thus extend liability for murder in California is a determination solely
within the province of the Legislature."). A full discussion of the possible conflict
between the fetal homicide laws and the Establishment Clause lies beyond the scope of
this Article. Suffice it to say that courts are disinclined to invalidate laws that have
secular purposes or to embark on the difficult task of disentangling such secular purposes
from impermissible, religious ones.
110 See, e.g., Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, supra note 5, at 1014 ("[R]egardless of
intent, these [state laws] create an environment in which prosecutions of pregnant women
seem reasonable and the right to abortion does not.").
11 1 See Press Release, Pew Research Center, supra note 36, at 1.
112 See McClain, supra note 105, at 172.
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killing of the fetus at the hands of a third party not only as a death, but also as
a criminal wrong. For the latter woman, on the other hand, the termination of
fetal life constitutes a difficult but justifiable decision. The moral choice to
bear and raise a child, or to prevent it from being born, belongs to the
woman. Such a decision can never legitimately rest with her attacker.
This distinction is possible because not all killings, or even all intentional
killings, constitute murder; it depends upon the context. Many aspects of our
law and culture reveal beliefs about life-taking that are much less absolute
than those of either the hardcore anti-abortion 13 or pro-choice camps. As a
society, we impose capital punishment on designated offenders and deem
homicide during war to be a patriotic duty, even when soldiers kill innocent
non-combatants. Recently, the Supreme Court indicated support for a state
statute that exempts physicians from criminal liability for prescribing lethal
doses of drugs at the request of terminally-ill patients.1 14 Indeed, from its
origins, the criminal law has exculpated some individuals who kill under
theories of justification or excuse. Rather than locating the decision to give or
take life solely with a deity, our secular regime invests legislatures,
prosecutors, judges, and juries with the authority to determine where a
killer's conduct falls on a doctrinal continuum ranging from non-criminal
homicide to capital murder.
No matter what legal status the fetus attains, the decision whether or not
to prevent its birth is still best made by its mother. Although the fetal
homicide laws do not directly threaten reproductive rights, proponents of
legal abortion must insist vigorously on the differences between a woman
who terminates her pregnancy and a third-party killer. Such an argument can
be made under existing criminal law principles. To this end, this Part
highlights the basic convergence of popular attitudes toward homicide and
abortion with those found in legal doctrine. However, this Part also
emphasizes the criminal law's need for a more complete understanding of the
maternal-fetal relationship and the uniquely invasive burdens of pregnancy.
Ultimately, it is the uniqueness of the relationship between the pregnant
113 A minority of anti-abortionists proclaim their own brand of "justifiable"
homicide when they engage in lethal attacks on abortion providers. See GORDON, supra
note 28, at 309-10 (discussing the violent tactics, including assassinations, used by some
anti-abortionists). The perpetrators of these attacks rationalize them in Utilitarian terms
(that is, killing one to save the lives of many) or as part of a holy war against baby-killers.
Cf id. at 309 (stating that anti-abortion assassins consider themselves "agents of holy
work"). Claims by the violent fringe of the anti-abortion movement that abortion is
murder thus have a particularly hypocritical ring.
114 See Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006) (holding that the Federal
Controlled Substances Act does not allow the Attorney General to prohibit doctors from
prescribing drugs for use in physician-assisted suicide under an Oregon law that allows
them to do so).
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woman and her fetus, rather than its similarity to other situations, that makes
abortion permissible, whereas other types of feticide constitute criminal
wrongs.
A. The Problem of Violence Against Pregnant Women
Fetal homicide laws target a variety of perpetrators, including robbers,
who face felony murder liability for killing a fetus in at least seventeen
states, 115 and drunk drivers, who can be charged with vehicular homicide for
causing fetal death in about twelve states. 116 Yet, if prosecutorial activity
tracks the most severe threat to pregnant women, a large percentage of
defendants will be men who abuse their female intimates. Pregnancy
violence constitutes a problem of significant proportions. Approximately four
to eight percent of all pregnant women experience physical abuse.' 17
Homicide ranks as the leading cause of pregnancy-associated fatalities and is
115 Information about felony murder liability for fetus killing is available in a
database maintained by the author; see also infra Part IV(B)(3) (discussing felony murder
liability).
116 Information about these vehicular homicide laws is available in a database
maintained by the author. Fetal homicide statutes have also been used to charge
individuals who attempted to obtain a baby by attacking a pregnant woman and removing
the fetus from her womb with a sharp object, such as scissors or a key. See Matthew T.
Mangino, When a Murder Victim is Pregnant: Prosecutors Confront Effect of
Controversial 'Fetal Homicide' Laws, 28 PA. L. WKLY 276, Mar. 7, 2005, at 8
(describing one of the first cases prosecuted under the UVVA and comparing it to similar
killings).
117 Judith MacFarlane, Barbara Parker, Karen Soeken & Linda Bullock, Assessing
for Abuse During Pregnancy: Severity and Frequency of Injuries and Associated Entry
into Prenatal Care, 267 J.A.M.A. 3176, 3176 (1992); CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL
AND PREVENTION, KEY SCIENTIFIC ISSUES FOR RESEARCH ON VIOLENCE OCCURRING
AROUND THE TIME OF PREGNANCY (1998). One group of researchers reports that such
percentages equated to the abuse of between 152,000 and 324,000 pregnant women in
1998. See Julie Gazmararian, Ruth Peterson, Alison M. Spitz, Mary M. Goodwin, Linda
E. Saltzman & James S. Marks, Commentary, Violence and Reproductive Health:
Current Knowledge and Future Research Directions, 4 MATERNAL & CHILD HEALTH J.
79, 80 (2000). But cf Richard J. Gelles, Violence and Pregnancy: Are Pregnant Women
at Greater Risk of Abuse?, 50 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 841, 845-46 (1988) (claiming that
pregnant women are not particularly likely to be abused, but acknowledging that they
"enjoy no special relief from the threat of violence either"). In at least one study, more
teenage girls reported abuse during pregnancy than did adult women; however, while the
incidence of abuse was higher for teenagers, adults reported more severe physical
assaults. See Barbara Parker, Judith MacFarlane, Karen Soeken, Sarah Torres & Doris
Campbell, Physical and Emotional Abuse in Pregnancy: A Comparison of Adult and
Teenage Women, 42 NURSING RES. 173, 175-76 (1993).
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responsible for about twenty percent of such deaths. 118 Studies indicate that
the vast majority of pregnant women who suffer violent attacks know their
assailants; most of these assailants are husbands or domestic partners.119
A man who assaults his pregnant partner often does so in a particularly
vicious manner-striking the woman's abdominal region as a means of
expressing his power over her, his anger at her altered physical state, or his
jealousy toward the future child.' 20 Blows to the belly may constitute a
deliberate effort to control the woman by destroying something that is
precious to her. 121 Yet, as we shall see, some attackers perpetrate more
instrumental killings that show malice toward the fetus itself.122
Although the available figures may "grossly underestimate the number of
women victimized by violence during pregnancy,"' 23 legal scholarship
related to the problem has focused on the threat to legal abortion that the fetal
homicide statutes allegedly pose, rather than on the statutes' potential to
deter and punish intimate killers. Indeed, so impassioned has been the
negative response from the left to the UVVA and its state-law siblings that
few law professors have considered the nature of the harm inflicted by the
pregnant woman's attacker. The most thoughtful work on pregnancy
violence by a legal scholar criticizes fetal homicide laws for "shrouding not
only ... the woman's injury, but ... the woman herself.' 12 4 According to
Deborah Tuerkheimer:
118 Isabelle L. Horon & Diana Cheng, Enhanced Surveillance for Pregnancy-
Associated Mortality-Maryland, 1993-1998, 285 J.A.M.A. 1455, 1457 (2001).
119 See Sandra L. Martin, Linda Mackie, Lawrence L. Kupper, Paul A. Buescher &
Kathryn E. Moracco, Physical Abuse of Women, Before, During, and After Pregnancy,
285 J.A.M.A. 1581, 1582 (2001) (finding that sixty-seven percent of abused pregnant
women in a North Carolina study suffered violence at the hands of husbands or partners
and that fourteen percent of the aggressors were other family members); see also
Hortensia Amaro, Lise E. Fried, Howard Cabral & Barry Zuckerman, Violence During
Pregnancy and Substance Use, 80 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 575, 576 (1990) (finding that
ninety-four percent of women in a study of poor, inner-city, minority communities were
acquainted with their attacker); MacFarlane et al., supra note 117, at 3177 ("[T]he
perpetrator of the abuse was almost always someone the woman knew intimately.").
120 See Schroedel & Peretz, supra note 19, at 344; see also Shari Roan, A Dirty
Secret, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1995, at El (describing a young woman's thoughts about why
her boyfriend battered her during her pregnancy).
121 Cf. Karla Fischer, Neil Vidmar & Rene Ellis, The Culture of Battering and the
Role of Mediation in Domestic Violence Cases, 46 SMU L. REv. 2117, 2138 (1993)
(noting that batterers often engage in "deliberate, calculating behavior" such as
"searching for and destroying a treasured object" belonging to their victims).
122 See infra text accompanying notes 297-98.
123 See Tuerkheimer, supra note 16, at 671.
124 Id. at 668.
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What is different-and particularly pernicious-about this approach [i.e.
the new criminal law framework recognizing fetal personhood] is that the
pregnant woman, who has historically been subject to paternalistic
regulations enforcing idealized notions of motherhood, has been rendered
invisible. Whereas before the pregnant woman was simply a vessel for the
fetus, now she is vanished. 125
While Tuerkheimer's description is superficially persuasive from a
feminist vantage, it fails to give an accurate assessment of the criminal law's
impact on perpetrators of pregnancy violence. It may be true that the current
law's separation of the pregnant woman and her fetus understates the fetus's
physical reliance on the woman's body. Yet, at least in homicide cases, the
outcome is often not the disappearance of the woman as victim, but rather the
double counting of the woman and the fetus to heighten the criminal liability
and punishment of the killer. The imposition of consecutive sentences 126 or
even the death penalty, based on a "multiple murders aggravator,"' 12 7 may
result, and under narrow circumstances, 12 8 such severe punishments are just.
In contrast, the alternative solutions that commentators like Tuerkheimer
propose-recognizing a separate crime of "assault on a pregnant woman"1 2 9
or providing a sentence enhancement for the killer based on his victim's
pregnancyl 3 0-might result in overly lenient penalties for pregnancy
violence, compared to the fetal homicide approach. For example, simply
creating a special category of assault crimes fails to make a meaningful
distinction between an attack on an expectant mother that causes her to lose
her fetus and one that does not.
125 Id. at 695.
126 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bullock, 868 A.2d 516, 521 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005)
(stating that the defendant was sentenced to two consecutive prison terms for the murder
of his girlfriend and the voluntary manslaughter of her fetus); State v. Holcomb, 956
S.W.2d 286, 288 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that the defendant was sentenced to two
consecutive life terms for the murders of his girlfriend and her fetus).
127 See infra text accompanying notes 248.
128 See infra text accompanying notes 288-98, 300-01 (discussing cases in which
the defendant intentionally killed a pregnant woman and also intended to kill the fetus or
at least knew of its existence).
129 See Tuerkheimer, supra note 16, at 710.
130 The House Report on the UVVA (renamed "Laci and Conner's Law") noted:
Even assuming, however, that current Federal sentencing guidelines would permit a
two-level sentence enhancement when the victim of a violent crime is pregnant,
whether under the "bodily injury" or "vulnerable victim" provisions, such a trivial
increase in punishment would not reflect the seriousness with which violent crimes
against pregnant women and unborn children should be treated.
H.R. REP. No. 108-420, pt. 1, at 8 (2004).
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Because existing legal discussions of pregnancy violence are not
satisfactory, this Article reopens the question with the goal of showing that a
distinction between mother and fetus does not inevitably eclipse the mother's
interests, nor does it always place her in an adversarial relation to her future
child. Existing regimes for punishing pregnancy violence are seriously
flawed, as this Article will show, but not because they designate the unborn
as potential victims. 131 My contention is that if the fetal homicide laws were
combined with other resources for abused women and more carefully drafted
to uphold defendants' rights, they would have the capacity to provide fair
protection for one aspect of reproductive choice. This choice is that of
carrying a fetus to term.
Women and families who have elected to have a child experience a loss
for which the state should be allowed to impose additional punishment-not
as tort-like compensation but as a retributive, expressive, and potentially
deterrent sentence. 132 Of course, the harm denounced by the criminal law is
ideally conceived as a societal harm, not as a private injury to the bereaved
family. In a similar vein, the interest in punishing fetal homicide lies with the
state, which administers criminal justice, rather than the unborn. While
victims' outrage and pain cannot justify the imposition of criminal
punishment, a penal theory that values the expression and reinforcement of
social norms 133 legitimately could count the death of the fetus in its
assessment of criminal wrongdoing.
B. Voluntary Pregnancy, Fetal Personhood, and the Rise of
Prenatal Medicine
Although pro-choice scholars often argue strenuously against any
formulation that presents mother and fetus as separate entities, 134 Roe itself
depended on an understanding of potential life that was separate from, and
131 See infra Part IV.
132 See Carolyn B. Ramsey, Homicide on Holiday: Prosecutorial Discretion,
Popular Culture, and the Boundaries of the Criminal Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1641,
1643-44, 1676-77 (2003) (contrasting the goals of the criminal law with those of the tort
regime).
133 1 envision some reciprocity between the preferences of the public and the
educational influence of the criminal law. I have argued elsewhere that the criminal law
need not always give voice to community values. Those values, in some instances, may
be unjust. See id. at 1644, 1686-87. Nevertheless, the law loses much of its power to
enforce anti-violence norms and otherwise discourage wrongdoing if it does not
acknowledge public sentiment.
134 See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text, and infra notes 216-17 and
accompanying text.
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sometimes in opposition to, the pregnant woman's rights. 135 Writing for the
majority in Roe, Justice Blackmun clearly stated that a fetus is not a person
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 136 However, the Roe opinion recognized
the value of potential life, 137 and it did not foreclose the possibility that
courts or legislatures might recognize fetal interests outside the context of
constitutional law.
The personhood (or at least the human status) of the fetus has grown
more difficult to deny due to the advent of medical technology that
essentially renders the contents of the womb visible and audible. The
heartbeat usually can be detected by the sixth week of pregnancy, 138 and
Web commerce now makes fetal heartbeat monitors available to expectant
parents over the Internet.139 These devices are touted as a comforting means
for women facing risky pregnancies to verify fetal life. 140 Ultrasound
imaging allows the doctor and the pregnant woman to see the unborn in real
time; proud families can watch videos of the fetus moving its tiny limbs.' 4 '
By the end of the third month, the fetus "has arms, hands, fingers, feet and
toes and can open and close its fists and mouth."' 142
Feminist scholars have written extensively about the way in which
technology frames the fetus "as a free-floating independent entity;"
marginalizes the woman who gives it sustenance; and condemns her for any
act or omission that causes prenatal harm, including the decision to terminate
135 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154, 158-64 (1973) (balancing the pregnant
woman's interest in privacy and autonomy against the state's interest in protecting
potential life).
136Id. at 158. Blackmun also noted that, in 1973, the unborn were not
"recognized... as persons in the whole sense" in other areas of law. Id. at 162
(explaining that wrongful death actions vindicate the interests of the parents and that,
under inheritance law, "[p]erfection of the interests involved ... has generally been
contingent upon live birth").
137 Id. at 154 (noting the state's interest in "protecting potential life"). This interest
was further defined and emphasized in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992); see also supra text accompanying
notes 91-92.
138 See WebMD Medical Reference, Pregnancy: Your Baby's Growth and
Development: Months 1 to 3, WEBMD.coM, Nov. 2005,
http://www.webmd.com/content/article/51/40829.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2006).
139 See, e.g., Stork Radio, Fetal Heartbeat Monitor,
http://www.storkradio.com/links.php?id=6 (last visited Oct. 12, 2006).
140 See id.
141 MacKinnon, supra note 5, at 1310-11 (discussing the effect of prenatal
ultrasound imaging). See Schroedel, Fiber & Snyder, supra note 18, at 93 (same).
142 See WebMD Medical Reference, supra note 138.
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her pregnancy. 143 Similarly, advances in the care of premature infants push
the point of viability earlier and earlier, blurring the distinction between a
fetus and a baby.144 Pro-choice advocates have observed these changes with
anxiety, for while medical technology has made pregnancy, in some senses,
less dangerous and frightening, it has also added fuel to the anti-abortion fire.
Pro-lifers have appropriated fetal imagery to bolster their claims that abortion
is murder. 145 Yet, outside of this debate, pictures of fetuses and descriptions
of how they develop are also readily available to women whose pregnancies
are desired.
The modem situation contrasts starkly with the cultural understanding of
fetal life that existed until the mid-nineteenth century. Characterized by the
invisibility of the fetus, this historical approach vested in the mother the
authority to detect "quickening" or fetal movement. She (not the unborn) was
the central figure in the pregnancy until the middle of the 1800s, when male
medical professionals began to assert scientific and moral control over
reproductive processes and relegate women to passivity. 146 Moreover, in the
past, higher rates of infant and childhood mortality discouraged pregnant
women from assigning value or personality to fetuses. 147 Finally, the modem
religious position that the unborn have a right to life from conception is of
relatively recent vintage; early Judeo-Christian writings associated the
existence of life or a soul with fetal movement. 148
Drawing on these precepts, English common law fixed the onset of
criminal liability at the moment when the fetus "is able to stir in the mother's
143 MacKinnon, supra note 5, at 1310-11; see also, e.g., PETCHESKY, supra note 28,
at xii-xiv (describing how anti-abortionists have appropriated fetal imagery-in The
Silent Scream video, for example-to drive home their message that abortion constitutes
murder).
144 PETCHESKY, supra note 28, at xv.
145 See id. at 339.
146 Siegel, supra note 23, at 292; see also generally id. at 280-323 (describing in
detail the role of male doctors in establishing governmental and medical control over
women's bodies and social roles).
147 Cf GORDON, supra note 28, at 23 (discussing high infant mortality rates in
America in the late eighteenth century).
148 See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 151
(1957); HULL & HOFFER, supra note 4, at 17-18, 32. Pro-choice Catholics note: "For
many centuries Catholic theologians, including Thomas Aquinas, held that infusion of the
soul is possible only when the embryo begins to show human form, i.e., a point after
conception." Brief for Catholics for a Free Choice et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellees, Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605) in THE
ABORTION RIGHTS CONTROVERSY IN AMERICA: A LEGAL READER 210 (N.E.H. Hull,
Williamjames Hoffer & Peter Charles Hoffer eds., 2004).
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womb."'149 The fact that killing it before quickening was not a crime for any
perpetrator prior to the mid-nineteenth century was thus embedded in the
medical, religious, and social understandings of that time. As Rosalind
Petchesky reminds us, "prevailing ideas about morality are inevitably shaped
by their historical and cultural contexts. This is as true of the concept of
'personhood' as it is of the concepts of 'murder' or 'maternal duty.' ' 150
However, the insight that fetal personhood is culturally constructed,
rather than being an objective fact, cuts both ways. While the pro-choice
movement can point to historical evidence that religious and social
opposition to abortion is relatively new, it will be difficult, if not impossible,
to put the genie of medical technology back into the bottle. The availability
of fetal imagery makes the unborn seem more like persons, and for expectant
mothers and families who can accept responsibility for a child, it becomes
possible to choose gender-specific names and engage in other activities that
make the new family member seem present and real. When a woman
miscarries or bears a stillborn baby, she may feel grief that equals that
experienced upon the death of a live-born child. Popular manuals designed to
help families through their suffering often efface the boundaries between
various stages of human development and give primacy to women's
emotional experience, rather than scientific or religious definitions of life. 151
One could argue that an expectant mother whose pregnancy ends grieves
"over the loss of the prospect of a child-not over the loss of a child."'1 52
But, culturally, the message is often that the mother has experienced her
baby's death.
The unwanted destruction of the fetus by a third party thus may be
perceived as a wrongful killing. Describing the loss of her daughter Laci's
late-term fetus at the hands of her son-in-law, Scott Peterson, Sharon Rocha
wrote to U.S. Senators: "When a criminal attacks a woman who carries a
child, he claims two victims. I lost a daughter, but I also lost a
grandson .. ."153 Rocha further explained her opposition to a proposed
149 WILLIAMS, supra note 148, at 152 (quoting Blackstone).
150 PETCHESKY, supra note 28, at 331.
151 See, e.g., SHEROKEE ILSE, EMPTY ARMS: COPING AFTER MISCARRIAGE,
STILLBIRTH, AND INFANT DEATH 3 (1982) ("The death of a 2 year-old is not necessarily
harder than a stillbirth, a neonatal death is not worse than a miscarriage."); CHRISTINE
MOULDER, MISCARRIAGE: WOMEN'S EXPERIENCES AND NEEDS 59-61 (1990) (stating that
some women feel they have lost a baby when they miscarry).
152 WILLIAMS, supra note 148, at 227 (emphasis added); see MacKinnon, supra note
5, at 1316 (contending that a fetus is only a person "born in the imagination .... not born
in the world").
153 H.R. REP. NO. 108-420, pt. 1, at 4 n.4 (2004) (quoting Letter from Sharon
Rocha to United States Senators Mike DeWine, Lindsey Graham, Orrin Hatch and United
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amendment to the UVVA which would have recognized an attack on a
pregnant victim as a more serious crime than an attack on a non-pregnant
victim, without according personhood to the fetus:
I hope that every legislator will clearly understand that such a single victim
amendment.., would be a painful blow to those, like me, who are left alive
after a two-victim crime, because Congress would be saying that Conner
[i.e. the late-term fetus] and other innocent unborn victims like him are not
really victims-indeed, that they never really existed at all. But our
grandson did live. He had a name, he was loved, and his life was violently
taken from him before he ever saw the sun.154
Such sentiments do not mandate fetal homicide laws or speak with
authority as to their desirability or constitutionality. To some, Rocha's view
may seem irrational and sentimental, compared to "hard" scientific facts that
make the beginning of human life a process, rather than an event.
Nevertheless, one cannot say that Rocha's sense that Peterson murdered her
grandson is any more culturally constructed than the older, common-law
view that a murder could not occur until the baby was born alive. Moreover,
pragmatically, there is no need for pro-choice advocates to oppose Rocha and
the many Americans who agree with her.
C. The Illegitimacy of the Third-Party Attacker's Conduct
The pro-choice camp strays from the essential meaning of reproductive
rights if it devotes as much energy to trivializing fetal life as it does to
promoting the autonomy and equality of women in our society. Surely no
reasonable person could argue that a man who kicks his pregnant girlfriend
in the stomach, 155 a driver who engages in an act of road rage, 156 or an ex-
boyfriend who shoots his estranged lover to death after she leaves him 157 had
a legitimate interest in causing the death of the unborn. These criminal actors
stripped their victims of the choice to become mothers, which denies female
autonomy just as much as forcing women to carry unwanted pregnancies to
term. Distinguishing consensual abortion from a violent actor's anti-social
destruction of a fetus is thus fundamental to women's rights.
States Congresswoman Melissa Hart (June 16, 2003) (on file with House Committee on
the Judiciary)).
154Id.
155 See State v. Coleman, 705 N.E.2d 419,420 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
156 See State v. Alfieri, 724 N.E.2d 477, 480-82 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
157 See People v. Taylor, 86 P.3d 881, 882-83 (Cal. 2004).
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Courts hearing Equal Protection challenges to fetal homicide laws have
relied on this distinction. For example, in State v. Merrill,158 the Minnesota
Supreme Court considered a motion to dismiss murder charges against a
defendant who allegedly shot a pregnant woman, killing both her and her 28-
day-old fetus. The defendant claimed that, by not distinguishing between
viable and non-viable fetuses, the murder provisions of Minnesota's criminal
code exposed him "to conviction as a murderer of an unborn child during the
first trimester of pregnancy, while others who intentionally destroy a
nonviable fetus, such as a woman who obtains a legal abortion and the doctor
who performs it, are not murderers."' 159 The court rejected this argument.
First, it noted that causing the death of a fetus without the mother's consent
differs markedly from the decisions and actions of a pregnant woman and her
doctor. 160 The constitutional right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy
"does not protect, much less confer on an assailant, a third-party unilateral
right to destroy the fetus."' 161 Second, according to Merrill, the assertion in
Roe that a fetus is not a person was limited by the Court's focus on deciding
the abortion question under the Fourteenth Amendment. 162 Finally, the
Merrill opinion stressed that, even in the abortion context, the state's interest
in protecting potential life precedes viability. 163 For all of these reasons, "the
viability of the fetus [was] 'simply immaterial' to an equal protection
challenge" to the murder statutes under which the defendant was charged. 164
Other courts that have considered whether a third-party killer is similarly
situated to a pregnant woman or her doctor have reached nearly identical
conclusions. 165
158 450 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1990).
159 Id. at 321.
160 See id. at 322.
161 Id.
162 See id.
163 See id.
164 Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 322.
165 See, e.g., State v. Alfieri, 724 N.E.2d 477, 482 (Ohio 1998) (distinguishing the
defendant in a vehicular homicide case from "a pregnant [woman] who elects to have her
pregnancy terminated by one legally authorized to perform the act"); State v. Holcomb,
956 S.W.2d 286, 291-92 (Mo. 1997) (reasoning that Holcomb's case differed from
abortion cases because he did not have the mother's consent to kill her and her fetus);
State v. Black, 526 N.W.2d 132, 135 (Wis. 1994) (distinguishing between the termination
of pregnancy and an intentional criminal act); People v. Ford, 581 N.E.2d 1189, 1199 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1991) (observing that a pregnant woman who chooses to have an abortion and a
defendant who intentionally murders a fetus are not similarly situated). Cf
Commonwealth v. Bullock, 868 A.2d 516, 524-25 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (holding that
Pennsylvania's fetal homicide statute was rationally related to the state's interest in
protecting potential life and noting that the statute did not exempt all women, but only all
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Courts addressing substantive due process challenges have also based
their rulings on the contrast between a pregnant woman and her attacker. For
example, rejecting the appellate argument of Wayne Coleman, who faced a
manslaughter conviction for killing Olivia Williams's fetus during a
domestic assault, an Ohio court stated: "Roe gave women a fundamental
right to terminate a pregnancy; however, that right does not translate into a
fundamental right of a third person to use violent conduct to deprive the
pregnant woman of her choice."'1 66
D. Abortion as Justifiable (or Excusable) Homicide
While the illegitimacy of a third-party assault on an expectant mother
may seem obvious, there is debate about whether abortion can remain legal if
fetuses are deemed "persons" or even merely "humans." Some activists from
both the pro-choice and anti-abortion camps have been quick to assume that
the personhood issue determines abortion's legality. 167 However, the notion
that all homicides constitute murder is neither mandated by the criminal law
nor reflected in the thinking of the "abortion grays." As Judith Thomson
observed, "the right to life consists not in the right not to be killed, but rather
in the right not to be killed unjustly. ' 168
1. The Legal Status of the Fetus
Exploration of abortion as justifiable homicide suggests several inquiries.
First, it is necessary to consider whether declaring a fetus to be some kind of
human being that can be murdered by a third party also makes abortion
murder. Second, suppose that a fetus is not only human, but also a legal
person. Does the personhood of the fetus change the analysis? I submit that it
does not. Whether the fetus is called a person, a human being, or merely a
victim, each of these terms indicates that it is capable of being murdered.
However, none of them dictates criminal liability for abortion. Some states
have declared fetuses to be persons under tort and probate law, and the
pregnant women, from criminal liability); Ford, 581 N.E.2d at 1199 (making a similar
ruling).
166 State v. Coleman, 705 N.E.2d 419, 421 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (citing People v.
Davis, 872 P.2d 591 (1994)).
167 See supra notes 5, 9, 12.
168 Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 47, 57
(1971).
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Supreme Court has indicated that a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy
is not thereby jeopardized.169
Does it make sense to recognize fetal personhood for the purposes of
criminal homicide, but not under the Constitution? Excluding some classes of
persons from the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment is controversial,
for it raises the specter of this country's past denial of full citizenship to live-
born blacks and women. Yet, the exclusion of fetuses from constitutional
protection is based not on an immutable, suspect category such as race or
sex, but rather on the fact that they have not yet been born.
170
169 See, e.g., Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 506 (1989) (opining
that the preamble to the Missouri law might be interpreted to offer fetal protection in tort,
probate, or other areas of law, but not to restrict abortion).
170 In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court noted that the word "person," as used to
define "citizens" under the Fourteenth Amendment, was clearly limited to individuals
"born or naturalized in the United States." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973)
(emphasis added). Other uses of "person" in the Constitution-to describe the
qualifications for Representatives, Senators, and the President, for example-indicate
applicability only to post-natal humans. See id. Going beyond the Supreme Court's sparse
discussion of this matter, one could argue that fetuses are not constitutional persons
because they appear to lack subjective feelings, self-consciousness, or reason. However,
other constitutional persons, such as corporations, arguably do not possess these
attributes either.
The constitutional personhood of the fetus undoubtedly would pose the greatest
difficulty for the continued legality of abortion, but even under this scenario, the Court
would not be bound to hold that the unborn's right to life outweighs a woman's rights to
either privacy or sex equality. John Hart Ely rejected the privacy penumbra underpinning
Roe and declared that the decision amounted to "bad constitutional law." John Hart Ely,
The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 947 (1973).
But even Ely opined that Justice Blackmun was wrong to assume that the constitutional
personhood of the fetus automatically would preclude the right to abortion. See id. at 926
n.48. If a fetus were a person under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court would have to
weigh the competing rights of each person and determine which would prevail. Because
state-compelled pregnancy requires a woman to give her body to the service of an
invader, the Court could hold that the woman's right prevailed over that of the fetus. See
infra Part III.D.3 (describing the burdens of pregnancy and child rearing).
Moreover, as Michael Dorf has noted, under the Constitution, some "persons" do not
enjoy the same rights as others:
[E]ven general constitutional language can be interpreted differently depending
upon the context. Corporations, for example, are "persons" under the Fourteenth
Amendment in the sense that their property cannot be taken without fair processes,
but not in the sense that they are entitled to vote on equal terms with natural persons.
Michael C. Dorf, How Abortion Politics Impedes Clear Thinking on Other Issues
Involving Fetuses, FINDLAW, May 28, 2003,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20030528.html.
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In any event, as this Article has shown, the vast majority of fetal
homicide statutes do not suggest conferring Fourteenth Amendment
personhood on the unborn, nor do they even use the term "person" to
describe the fetal victim. 171 For this and other reasons, the Supreme Court is
unlikely to use the statutes as a springboard to abrogate reproductive rights.
The Court at least gives lip service to the importance of affirming
controversial, landmark decisions like Roe and Miranda v. Arizona,172 due to
their deeply ingrained place in American popular culture. 173 Even without
the centrist presence of Justice O'Connor, the Roberts Court probably will
not accord fetuses constitutional personhood. 174 As Jeffrey Rosen opined in a
2003 editorial: "[N]o responsible justice could invoke the fetal homicide
laws as evidence of the public's agreement that fetuses before viability
should have rights indistinguishable from ... [other] human beings." 175
Indeed, many staunch anti-abortionists realize that raising fetuses to the
status of persons under the Constitution almost certainly would require a
constitutional amendment, 176 which both Congress and the public seem loath
to support. 177
171 See supra text accompanying notes 74-78; see also, e.g., State v. MacGuire, 84
P.3d 1171, 1180 (Utah 2004) ("This statute's use of the term 'person' to refer to a fetal
victim defines the crime of aggravated murder. It does not declare a fetus to be a person
entitled to equal protection, nor does it restrict a woman's right to obtain an abortion.").
172 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
173 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 869 (1992); see also
Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) ("Whether or not we would agree with
Miranda's reasoning and its resulting rule, were we addressing the issue in the first
instance, the principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it now ...
. Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the
warnings have become part of our national culture.").
174 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 859 (discussing Americans' long reliance on the legality
of abortion). Justice O'Connor opined that overturning Roe could only be done "at the
cost of both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court's legitimacy, and to the
Nation's commitment to the rule of law." Id. at 869. The confirmation of a conservative
to succeed O'Connor still leaves four dedicated votes for reproductive rights: Justices
Breyer, Ginsburg, Stevens, and Souter. Although the swing voter, Justice Anthony
Kennedy, opposed so-called "partial birth abortion" procedures in Stenberg v. Carhart,
530 U.S. 914, 956 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting), he earlier voted to affirm Roe in
Casey, 505 U.S.at 843. Moreover, he recently upheld the right of privacy in Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
175 Jeffrey Rosen, A Viable Solution, LEGAL AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 20.
176 See PETCHESKY, supra note 28, at 261-62, 335.
177 See Neal Devins, Through the Looking Glass: What Abortion Teaches Us About
American Politics, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 293, 299-300 (1994) (reviewing BARBARA
HINKSON & DAVID M. O'BRIEN, ABORTION AND AMERICAN POLrrIcs (1993)). Even if the
Court overturned Roe, Congress might hesitate to pass a federal law banning abortion.
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This Article thus focuses on the scenario that represents the most
common position taken by state legislatures with regard to fetal homicide:
Homicide is particularized to the species homo sapiens, but aside from
recognizing a fetus as some kind of human being that can be wrongfully
killed, the state's murder or manslaughter statutes do not confer on it any
other rights or attributes of personhood. 17
8
2. Abortion and Black-Letter Criminal Law
Even though the fetal homicide laws do not facially conflict with
reproductive rights, one still might ask: Why is abortion a valid exception to
the general rule that intentional killing, including the killing of a fetus,
constitutes murder? Pro-choice Americans need to have an answer to this
question.
Writing in the 1970s, several scholars compared abortion to various
forms of homicide that the criminal law declines to punish and argued that,
even if pro-choicers conceded the tenuous comparison of an acorn with an
oak tree, abortion still was not legally or morally wrong. 179 For instance,
Donald Regan and Judith Thomson invoked the Bad Samaritan principle
under which an individual legally may fail to help someone in need, even if
the needy person's death results. 180 According to this reasoning, the burdens
imposed on a pregnant woman-the risk to her life, the physical pain and
discomfort, as well as the lengthy time during which her body is
commandeered for childbearing-weigh more heavily than those that other
potential Samaritans can refuse to undertake.181
The pregnant woman's relationship to her fetus is also distinguishable
from any relationship in which the law traditionally imposes a duty to act.
Unlike the voluntary parent of a live-born child, a woman who seeks an
abortion has not chosen to have a baby.' 82 In cases of contraceptive failure or
The Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 arguably tracks the distaste of many
"abortion grays" for late-term procedures, rather than revealing a more generalized
hostility toward women's right to terminate their pregnancies. See supra text
accompanying notes 36-37 (discussing poll data).
178 See supra text accompanying notes 74-78.
179 See Thomson, supra note 168, at 47-48 ("A newly fertilized ovum, a newly
implanted clump of cells, is no more a person than an acorn is an oak tree.") However,
Thomson proceeded to argue that, even if pro-lifers establish that the fetus is a person,
they still must explain why abortion is impermissible. See id. at 48, 57.
180 See Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1569, 1574-75
(1979); Thomson, supra note 168, at 56.
181 See Regan, supra note 180, at 1579-83, 1589; Thomson, supra note 168, at 63.
182 See Regan, supra note 180, at 1597-98.
2006]
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
coerced sex, she did not even decide to engage in unprotected intercourse.' 83
Moreover, unlike an individual who legally must continue a rescue effort
once she has begun it, a pregnant woman does not raise the unconscious
fetus's psychological expectations of being saved. Indeed, she arguably
leaves it no worse off than it would have been if she and her sexual partner
had never conceived it. 18 4
This argument has some appeal, particularly in its insight that the
presence or absence of the choice to give birth, and thus to assume
responsibility for the baby, distinguishes abortion from infanticide. 185
Ultimately, however, formalistic efforts to shoehorn abortion into the law of
omissions prove less than satisfying. Whereas the Bad Samaritan principle
applies to a failure to act, 186 the woman's decision to have an abortion and
the doctor's conduct in performing it qualify as an action that removes and
kills the fetus, rather than a mere refusal to nurture it.18 7
183 Cf Greenwood, supra note 66, at 603-06 (indicating that, although anti-
abortionists believe that one accepts a child into the family when one decides to have sex,
proponents of legal abortion may view the fetus as a mistake that happened because of
contraceptive failure). Thomson analogized contraceptive failure to a home invasion that
occurs despite precautions taken by the homeowner:
It would be... absurd to say [that I gave a burglar a right to use my house] if I had
had bars installed outside my windows.., to prevent burglars from getting in, and a
burglar got in only because of a defect in the bars. It remains equally absurd if we
imagine it is not a burglar, but an innocent person who blunders or falls in.
Thomson, supra note 168, at 59. Catharine MacKinnon has argued that "[w]omen
often do not control the conditions under which they become pregnant." MacKinnon,
supra note 5, at 1312. Although MacKinnon overstates the similarities between rape and
all heterosexual sex, poverty and economic dependence do play a role in undermining
meaningful consent to intercourse. See id. Faced with psychological pressure and other
types of coercion, women (and especially inexperienced teenage girls) may not assert
their preference for their partners to use a condom, thus risking unwanted pregnancy.
184 See Regan, supra note 180, at 1599-1600.
185 See id. at 1601 n.43; see also Greenwood, supra note 66, at 609 (proposing a
"responsibility-centered" view of abortion under which a woman's duties toward the
fetus begin when she decides to accept it into the family); Thomson, supra note 168, at
65.
186 Defenders of the Bad Samaritan rule often explicitly base their view on the
act/omission distinction, contending that "surely there is a moral difference between
stabbing a victim to death, and failing to call the police or otherwise coming to the
victim's aid." JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 88 (2d ed. 1995).
187 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 923-27 (2000) (providing graphic
descriptions of abortion procedures, including "vacuum aspiration," "dilation and
evacuation," and "dilation and extraction," which may result in the dismemberment of
late-term fetuses). To rebut this objection, Regan contends that, if the fetus remains in the
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Necessity, or choice-of-evils, offers another possible justification for
abortion. According to this utilitarian doctrine, a person may violate the
criminal law if, by doing so, she averts a greater harm. The doctrine most
easily applies to less serious crimes than homicide-stealing a loaf of bread
to prevent starvation, for example. But it can be used to justify homicide, as
well. For example, the Model Penal Code's discussion of whether a mountain
climber may cut the rope connecting him to a fellow climber who has
tumbled over a cliff is apposite to a scenario in which a complicated
pregnancy threatens the life of both the woman and her fetus.188 If the
mountaineer does not cut the rope, both he and his climbing partner will
perish. If he cuts the rope, the criminal law justifies, or at least excuses, his
decision.18 9
Despite a slightly uncomfortable fit,190 the necessity defense was used to
exculpate doctors who performed illegal abortions to preserve the life or
sanity of pregnant women during the early twentieth century.' 91
Extrapolating from the English case, Rex v. Bourne, in which a physician was
acquitted, 192 Glanville Williams argued that "the mother's life must be
considered in relation to its quality as well as to its duration."'193 In his view,
the pregnant woman's physical pain and mental health were essential to a
suitably broad understanding of life-preservation. However, both Williams
and the Bourne court distinguished the life of "the unborn child" from "the
yet more precious life of the mother"194-a distinction that becomes harder
to make if the law treats a fetus's death the same as a woman's when
punishing third-party offenders.
mother's womb, it is automatically nourished at her expense. Removal is thus necessary
to refuse aid. See Regan, supra note 180, at 1575.
188 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 cmt. 3.
189 Id.
190 The contours of the common-law necessity defense were quite narrow. It did not
apply to homicide cases unless the killer faced imminent death and it was certain that the
non-consenting victim would have died anyway. See Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14
Q.B. 273 (1884). Moreover, such harm-balancing often seemed to be a matter of
numbers: one life could be taken to spare many. See WAYNE LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES OF
CRIMINAL LAW 396 (2003). Such facts do not exist in the abortion context, unless one
considers the social harm inflicted on the pregnant woman's live-born children if she dies
in labor or cannot care for them due to the psychological and socioeconomic pressures of
pregnancy.
191 See WILLIAMS, supra note 148, at 161-63, 166.
192 Rex v. Bourne, (1939) 1 K.B. 687 (Eng.).
193 See WILLIAMS, supra note 148, at 163.
194 See id. at 162 (quoting Justice Macnaghten's opinion in Rex v. Bourne).
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A better way to contend that abortion is not murder, with reference to
traditional criminal doctrines, looks to self-defense theory.195 This approach
is more convincing for three reasons. First, it applies to acts, as well as
omissions. Second, it more clearly legitimizes killing in a one-on-one
encounter between human beings than does the choice-of-evils doctrine.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the self-defense approach describes
the threatening, physical intrusion that the pregnant woman experiences. 196
As Eileen McDonagh puts it: "Even if the fetus [is] a person, a woman is
justified in killing it because of what it does to her when it imposes wrongful
pregnancy, whatever might be her personal reasons for doing so."'1 9 7
A potential objection to this reasoning arises from the difficulty of
analogizing a developing human to dominant cultural and legal conceptions
of a weapon-wielding, homicidal intruder. The paradigmatic self-defense
case involves an innocent person who kills to protect herself against a deadly
threat from a willful assailant.198 However, the criminal law sometimes
permits an actor to cause death in self-defense even if the one killed did not
intentionally seek to inflict harm. 199 Indeed, dating back to early English law,
the use of deadly force against an aggressor has often been described as an
excuse-based doctrine; "[i]n many cases.. .it is hard to argue convincingly
that the aggressor is the 'bad' or dangerous person, and the defender is the
'good' or more socially desirable individual. '200 Regan offers a hypothetical
in which two survivors of a shipwreck cling to each other in the open ocean.
When one of them becomes delirious and starts to drag the other down,
"[s]urely the one being clung to may disentangle himself and save himself if
he can." 201
Some anti-abortionists today are willing to accept self-defense rationales
for terminating a pregnancy when it is literally necessary to save the mother
195 See EILEEN L. MCDONAGH, BREAKING THE ABORTION DEADLOCK: FROM CHOICE
TO CONSENT 7 (1996).
196 See infra text accompanying notes 210-11.
197 MCDONAGH, supra note 195, at 10.
198 See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
199 For example, a woman would be acquitted of murder if she shot a very young
child who pointed a loaded gun at her, even though the child was too young to form
criminal intent. DRESSLER, supra note 186, at 197 (citing SANFORD H. KADISH &
STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 876 (5th ed. 1989)); see
also Regan, supra note 180, at 1611 ("[It seems clear that the privilege of self-defense
extends beyond a privilege to resist willful attacks.").
200 DRESSLER, supra note 186, at 209; see id. at 208 (noting the long-standing
formulation of the doctrine as an excuse).
201 See Regan, supra note 180, at 1612.
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from death.202 However, for pro-choice advocates, as well as for many
"grays," a scenario in which the pregnant woman will die if she carries the
fetus to term does not define the full array of circumstances in which
abortion should be legal. Moving beyond a physical threat to life necessitates
arguing that the woman's existence would be so severely compromised by an
unwanted pregnancy as to legitimate her self-defensive decision to "save"
herself.20 3 To support such a contention, a more complete legal
understanding of the maternal-fetal relationship would be helpful.
3. Understanding the Harms of Compelled Pregnancy
As the discussion above suggests, abortion is roughly analogous to some
forms of life-taking that Anglo-American law deems non-criminal. Yet, the
relationship of the pregnant woman to her fetus differs in key respects from
any other relationship with which the criminal codes must grapple. This is so
because the fetus physically invades and resides inside the mother's body;
medieval medical writings referred to it as a "parasite." 204 Its existence thus
burdens her in a way that it never burdens a third party. Moreover, its
dependence on her is not replicated in its position vis-A-vis anyone else.
Rather than adopting a formalistic approach that tries to force abortion
into pre-existing doctrinal categories, it would be wiser to ask the criminal
202 The theory of the fetus as an "unjust aggressor" who threatens the pregnant
woman seems to appeal to pro-lifers because it allows a narrow therapeutic exception
without undermining the basic premise that the law must protect the lives of the unborn.
See LUKER, supra note 4, at 232-33. Unusual scenarios, such as collateral damage to the
fetus from cancer radiation, are often mentioned. See Callahan, The Roman Catholic
Position, supra note 4, at 68-72 (explaining the Catholic doctrine of "double effect,"
which allows indirect killing during surgery or therapy performed on the mother). Yet the
few life-threatening conditions whose remedies indirectly cause fetal death do not
encompass the full spectrum of physical dangers to pregnant women, which range from
blood clots to eclampsia. As a general matter, full-term pregnancy and childbirth pose
greater risks of death to the mother than does early term abortion. See Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 149 n.44 (1973).
203 Abortions for rape victims are perhaps easiest to condone under this reasoning.
Although a rape victim may not face a great risk of death if she carries her pregnancy to
term, the growth of the fetus in her womb prolongs the violent invasion of the rape, thus
exacerbating her physical and psychological injuries. However, this Article does not limit
the analysis to pregnancies arising from rape. See infra text accompanying notes 211 &
214. (discussing the harms of compelled pregnancy for any woman who does not wish to
bear a child).
204 HULL & HOFFER, supra note 4, at 18 (discussing medieval views of abortion);
see also Ellen Willis, Abortion: Is a Woman a Person?, in POWERS OF DESIRE: THE
POLITICS OF SEXUALITY 473 (Ann Snitow, Christine Stansell & Sharon Thompson eds.,
1983) (describing the fetus as an invader).
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law to achieve greater insight into the maternal-fetal relationship. The
paradigmatic associations of self-defense doctrine with male-on-male
violence-the protection of family and property from an armed intruder, for
example-are ill-suited to the task. Nor does the historical legitimization of
female violence arising from abuse by men 205 provide an answer, except in
cases of rape. Instead, the negative impact of forced pregnancy on women's
self-determination over their bodies must be more fully explained to bolster a
self-defensive theory of abortion-not merely in narrow therapeutic
circumstances, but in a wider variety of cases. The harms that an unwanted
pregnancy imposes on women do not evaporate simply because we recognize
the human status of the unborn in some legal contexts. The pro-choice camp
must assert the debilitating nature of those harms with renewed vigor and
clarity so that abortion continues to be legal, regardless of the outcome of the
personhood debate.
The burdens of pregnancy can be described as affecting both privacy and
equality.20 6 Requiring a woman to carry a fetus to term appropriates her body
and labor, without consent or compensation, to transform a developing
human into a live-born infant.20 7 From an equality perspective, her
reproductive capacities are used to sustain offspring in a way that men's are
not, and this unequal, state-imposed burden is inextricably intertwined with
impermissible stereotypes about the maternal role of the female sex.20 8 From
a privacy perspective, the state denies the woman control over her body in a
society that generally places high value on bodily integrity, autonomy, and
205 See Carolyn B. Ramsey, Intimate Homicide: Gender and Crime Control, 1880-
1920, 77 U. COLO. L. REv. 101, 105, 128, 139 (2006).
206 The Court has neither analyzed abortion regulation under the Equal Protection
Clause nor recognized pregnancy-related classifications as being facially sex-based. See
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). However, it has implicitly acknowledged that
the Equal Protection Clause might provide an alternate basis for the abortion right. In
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, for example, Justice
O'Connor indicated that abortion restrictions must not be used to consign women to
traditional maternal roles. See Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852, 856 (1992) ("The ability of
women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been
facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.").
207 See Siegel, supra note 23, at 348.
208 Luker has demonstrated a strong linkage between anti-abortion beliefs and a
traditional worldview that accords women primary responsibility for keeping house,
raising children, and caring for the needs of their husbands. Many pro-lifers view
motherhood as women's natural destiny, whereas economic independence, attained
through employment outside the home is described as selfish. See LUKER, supra note 4,
at 159-63.
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self-determination. 20 9 Both theoretical frameworks have validity, but in the
final analysis, a focus on privacy-understood to protect the values listed
above-most persuasively supports the distinction between a woman who
has an abortion and any third-party attacker, including the biological father.
The appropriation of the woman's body for childbearing has massive
physical consequences. A woman may endure side effects including nausea
and vomiting, headaches, shortness of breath, fatigue, constipation, gas,
weight gain, breast discomfort, nasal congestion, nosebleeds, leg and back
aches, insomnia, and irritability during the first trimester of a "healthy"
pregnancy alone.210 Labor pain is severe enough for local anesthesia, which
comes with attendant risks, and if the doctor delivers the baby through
Caesarean section, the mother must undergo the danger and discomfort of a
major operation. No third party has to suffer any of these physical burdens.
Nor does any man, including the father, ever endure them. Bearing a child at
the behest of the state thus constitutes a form of involuntary, unpaid servitude
for women. Andrew Koppelman has even equated it to slavery, and argued
that legal precedents justify homicide as a means of escape, where slavery is
not authorized by positive law. 211
Both pro-choice advocates and the Supreme Court extend their
arguments beyond the burdens of pregnancy to consider those of childcare as
well. The Roe Court emphasized the potential physical and psychological
harms stemming from the governmental imposition of this duty.212
According to scholars who locate the abortion right under the Equal
Protection Clause, a woman who has an unplanned pregnancy may have to
209 See, e.g., In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1243-44, 1251-52 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(holding that a court may not impose a Caesarean section on a terminally ill pregnant
woman without obtaining her informed consent or ascertaining her decision through a
"substituted judgment" procedure); McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (Allegheny
County Ct. 1978) (refusing to order Shimp to donate bone marrow to save his cousin).
210See Ann Douglas, Ready or Not: The First Trimester, WEBMD.coM,
http://www.webmd.com/content/Article/88/99722.htm?pagenumber--l (last visited Oct.
12, 2006).
211 Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of
Abortion, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 480 (1990) (arguing that the right to an abortion should be
grounded in the Thirteenth Amendment). Koppelman cites United States v. Amistad, 40
U.S. (15 Pet.) 518 (1841), in which the Supreme Court recognized a right of resistance
against unlawful slavery. See Koppelman, supra, at 511-13. Suggesting a close parallel
between unwanted pregnancy and the conditions faced by enslaved African-Americans
would be unpersuasive, and even racist. Except in cases of incest or rape, the level of
brutality and coercion involved in forced childbearing is not literally equivalent to that
suffered by black slaves. Nevertheless, compelled pregnancy can be characterized as a
form of exploitation that lasts, depending on how the argument is framed, either nine
months or much of a lifetime.
212 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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forego educational and employment opportunities-a deprivation that further
entrenches her dependence on men and the state.213 Discriminatory societal
norms about good and bad parenting saddle women with greater
responsibility for child welfare if they keep their babies and also constrain
their freedom to give them up for adoption.214
Nevertheless, without considering the threat to bodily autonomy posed
by the pregnancy itself, it is difficult to argue that a mother legally can abort
her fetus, whereas a biological father who kills it to avoid paternal
obligations is guilty of murder.215 The most persuasive justification for
abortion at criminal law thus inheres defending against the physical invasion
213 See Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955,
1017 (1984); MacKinnon, supra note 5, at 1318; Siegel, supra note 23, at 375-77.
Although most proponents of the equality approach shy away from the argument that
abortion is justifiable homicide, see, e.g., Law, supra at 1021, Cass Sunstein believes that
a focus on sex discrimination allows us to acknowledge that "fetuses are in important
respects human beings" and that destroying them is "morally problematic." Cass R.
Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 32 (1992). In his view,
the undesirability of the Hobson's choice between involuntary motherhood and back-
alley procedures, which endanger women without fully protecting fetuses, makes
abortion permissible. See id. at 38.
214 A potential problem with including forced childcare among the harms of illegal
abortion is that it elides the adoption alternative. Making it unlawful for women to
terminate their pregnancies does not necessarily mean that they have to raise unwanted
offspring. They can give live-born infants up for adoption-an option that the pro-choice
literature unduly neglects. However, adoption may provide less of an escape route than
first meets the eye. Several commentators underscore the unequal social pressure on a
pregnant woman to raise her child; they document the emotional trauma and guilt that she
experiences if she chooses to abandon her flesh-and-blood to others' care. See DWORKIN,
supra note 43, at 103-04; Naomi Cahn, Birthing Relationships, 17 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J.
163, 163 (2002); Siegel, supra note 23, at 371-72. Furthermore, among minorities, the
fear that the baby will not be adopted by a permanent home arises from the realities of
race-based adoption policies and the preferences of adoptive parents. R. Richard Banks,
The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents' Racial Preferences Through
Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE L.J. 875, 881 (1998); Kim Forde-Mazrui, Note,
Black Identity and Child Placement: The Best Interests of Black and Biracial Children,
92 MICH. L. REv. 925, 936-37 (1994) (citing Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black
Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1163
(1991)).
215 Men have been convicted under fetal homicide statutes of instrumental killings
designed to rid them of the burdens of fatherhood. See, e.g., Bullock v. State, 111 S.W.2d
380, 382 (Ark. 2003) ("Because Bullock did not want to be a father, he hired three other
men to beat [his girlfriend] Shiwona [Pace] so as to cause the miscarriage or stillbirth of
Heaven Pace, an unborn fetus."); see also infra text accompanying note 297 (discussing
the Bullock case). Outside the criminal context, courts also give the father little or no
control over the woman's decision to have an abortion or carry the fetus to term. See Lior
Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 854 n.227 (2005).
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of the pregnancy, with its attendant risks, discomforts, and limitations. This
is, of course, a situation that the father does not face.
To insure abortion's continued legality (given popular, legislative, and
judicial support for the view that a fetus is a human life capable of being
wrongfully terminated), pro-choice Americans need to renew their emphasis
on the autonomy-denying violation that unwanted pregnancy inflicts and
reduce the significance they attach to the fetal personhood issue. Legal
abortion protects against nothing less than the requisition of women's bodies
to sustain offspring. If we return the spotlight to the infringement of the
pregnant woman's bodily autonomy, it becomes possible to argue that
abortion should remain legal, regardless of whether the fetus is a person, a
human, or simply a blob of cells.
E. Maternal Interests Versus Fetal Interests?
Some pro-choice advocates deny the humanity of the fetus and question
the legitimacy of the state's interest in protecting potential life. 2 16 They
object that recognizing the fetus as a human being or a person who can be
murdered will be adversarial to women's interests.217 In their view,
autonomy appears threatening to the feminist agenda when it is applied to the
unborn because it severs the intimate maternal-fetal connection, thus
jeopardizing the woman's sovereignty over an entity that depends on and
exists inside her.218
216 LUKER, supra note 4, at 184 (describing the arguments of pro-choice activists);
Schroedel, Fiber, & Snyder, supra note 18, at 104 (describing the most extreme pro-
choice position); see also Siegel, supra note 23, at 348 (criticizing the Roe Court's
unexamined assumption that the state has an interest in protecting potential life).
217 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 17, at 92 ("Feminist theorists must take notice of
this trend, as there is no way to equalize the rights of the fetus and the woman without
undermining the liberty interests Roe granted women."); Bruchs, supra note 17, at 136
("[T]he interests sought to be protected under 'Laci and Conner's Law' and those sought
to be protected under abortion law are in conflict with one another, and... the two laws
cannot possibly co-exist indefinitely without one acting as a detriment to the other."). Cf
Julia Epstein, The Pregnant Imagination, Fetal Rights and Women's Bodies: A Historical
Inquiry, 7 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 139, 160-61 (1995) (arguing that recognizing fetal rights
as distinct from maternal rights violates pregnant women's bodily integrity).
218 See MacKinnon, supra note 5, at 1314-15 (contending that fetal rights exist in
"direct tension with sex equality rights" and that severing the connection between mother
and fetus will strip the pregnant woman of decision-making power); see also Schroedel,
Fiber, & Snyder, supra note 18, at 92 (stating that many feminists view the fetal rights
movement as a "smokescreen for hiding broader political attacks aimed at undermining
women's exercise of full citizenship").
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Feminists also have been reluctant to theorize pregnancy in terms of the
"connection thesis."219 This strand of theory established by relational
feminists, such as Robin West, associates women with care-giving in
personal relationships. 220 The idea of connection has some power to aid our
understanding of pregnancy violence. However, in the final analysis,
relational feminism inadvertently may strengthen the anti-abortionists'
position.
To its credit, the connection thesis helps explain an expectant mother's
unique and growing bond with the unborn life in her body (and hence her
injury if a violent attack causes her to miscarry). Tuerkheimer refers to a
"woman's stake in her pregnancy."'221 Presenting a more complex and
textured view of this relationship than West does, Tuerkheimer develops an
integrated theory of the pregnant woman's multiplicitous self, which has
interests in both autonomy and connection, to argue for special laws that
criminalize pregnancy violence without establishing the fetus as a separate
person under law.22 2
Relational feminism makes other contributions to the debate as well.
Underscoring the pregnant woman's physical and emotional ties to the fetus,
it helps distinguish her from a third-party attacker, who does not have the
same bond. A focus on the connectedness of women's experiences also
suggests a contrast between murder and the "morally responsible decision" to
get an abortion so that "new life will be borne only if it will be nurtured and
219 Tuerkheimer notes that feminist theorists, as well as criminal law scholars, are
reluctant to explore the maternal-fetal relationship, perhaps due to "the centrality of the
abortion debate to the feminist agenda." Tuerkheimer, supra note 16, at 705 n.200.
220 The "connection thesis" is associated with a school of thought known by the
basically interchangeable labels "relational feminism," "cultural feminism," and
"difference theory." Exemplifying this theoretical orientation, Robin West writes:
Because women are fundamentally connected to other human life, women value and
enjoy intimacy with others (just as because men are fundamentally separate from
other human life men value and enjoy autonomy). Because women are connected
with the rest of human life, intimacy with the "other" comes naturally. Caring,
nurturance, and an ethic of love and responsibility for life is second nature.
Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 18 (1988). Elsewhere, she
describes the "shared physical identity between woman and fetus" as a "counter-
autonomous experience." Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A
Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 140
(1987). See generally, CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL
THEORY IN WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982) (presenting the famous hypothetical of Jake
and Amy to show that, while boys argue in terms of formal rights, girls are concerned
with personal relationships).
221 Tuerkheimer, supra note 16, at 706.
222 See id. at 706-07.
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loved. '223 Finally, relational feminism emphasizes that obligations to live-
born children, spouses, and employers may outweigh competing duties to the
unborn. 224 In short, it speaks in terms of responsibilities, rather than offering
atomistic rights talk that might be construed as selfish.
Ultimately, however, the "connection thesis" does little to further sound
policy in the reproductive context. The ethic of care can be faulted for
promoting a view of women as maternal, self-denying, and responsible for
the well being of others. 225 It inadvertently may bolster the social message
that batterers, through their violence, seek to enforce-that the female
partner is to blame for family troubles.226 Hence, relational feminism risks
opening the floodgates of maternal liability for fetal harm.227
Moreover, despite its aspiration to strengthen reproductive freedom by
removing the stigma of irresponsibility from the decision to terminate a
pregnancy,228 relational feminism actually makes the defense of abortion
more difficult.229 The essentialist view that women give and preserve other
human life, whereas men are less connected to it,230 could easily be co-opted
by anti-abortion groups. Misplaced emphasis on women's selfless nature
conflicts, for example, with their basic rights to privacy and self-defense:
223 Robin West, Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HIARV. L. REv. 43, 83 (1990).
224 See id. at 84-85.
225 Relational feminists describe women's responsibility for feeding, protecting, and
teaching young children as a "pre-legal" and "pre-patriarchal" condition. See West,
Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 220, at 25 (describing the views of Marilyn
French). For those who see women's care-giving role as being socially constructed,
however, the "connection thesis" threatens to facilitate the continued subordination of the
female sex. See, e.g., Karlan & Ortiz, supra note 106, at 895 (asking whether relational
feminism resonates because "it reflects women's authentic nature or because it reflects
the domesticated nature men have led women to adopt"); Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32, 39
(1987) ("Women value care because men have valued us according to the care we give
them .... Women think in relational terms because our existence is defined in relation to
men.").
226 See Fischer, Vidmar, & Ellis, supra note. 121, at 2129-30. In the context of
domestic violence, it may be especially dangerous for women to give up on autonomy
and rights talk, due to the critical need to help victims of battering separate from their
abusers.
227 See supra text accompanying notes 63-65, 69 (discussing courts' reason for
overturning the convictions of pregnant drug users).
228 See West, Taking Freedom Seriously, supra note 223, at 84.
229 See generally, Karlan & Ortiz, supra note 106; McClain, supra note 105, at 165-
66.
230 See, e.g.,West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 220, at 14-16, 24.
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When a man's home, family, much less his body is intruded upon, our
laws and our culture do not expect his response to be self-sacrifice .... The
opposite is true for women, however, who are most often associated in our
culture and our laws with self-sacrifice and giving norms rather than self-
defense norms.23 1
Another way of looking at the problem--the one advocated by this
Article-suggests that the mother's rights and the protection of fetal life may
be aligned in some contexts, even if they are adversarial in others. The
abortion right established in Roe and its progeny arises from a bifurcated
understanding of mother and fetus.232 It is hard to see how it could be
otherwise, since the abortion procedure physically removes the fetus from the
womb to prevent it from using the woman's body as a resource. But this does
not mean that conceptualizing the fetus as, in some respects, distinct from the
mother creates inherently oppositional interests. If a pregnant woman wants
to have a child, a statute that criminalizes fetal homicide by a third party
vindicates her decision, as well as punishing the wrongful killing of a nascent
human. Fetal homicide statutes have the potential to support a right to
choose-the right to carry a fetus to term without violent interference-that
should not be viewed as antithetical to feminist goals.
IV. FAIRNESS TO FETAL MURDER DEFENDANTS
Pro-choice advocates who vehemently oppose any hint of fetal rights
miss an opportunity for dialogue with the "abortion grays" about protecting
women's choices and, in particular, about the unique, sex-specific burdens
that pregnant women face. Meanwhile, a myopic focus on the "personhood"
issue obscures flaws in the fetal homicide statutes that signal deeper threats
231 McDonagh, supra note 195, at 19. McDonagh is also tempted by relational
approaches. See id. at 186-90. As she puts it: "We can value care, but not coerced care."
Id. at 187 (emphasis added). Unfortunately, this distinction may be difficult to enforce.
Framing arguments for legal abortion in the essentialist idiom that relational feminists
such as Robin West favor exacerbates the risk that the law will be used to make "deviant"
or "selfish" women conform to their "natural" roles. For this reason, in my view, it is
unwise to jettison autonomy principles.
232 For a discussion of how the Court has viewed the fetus as distinct from the
pregnant woman, see supra text accompanying notes 135-37. The undue burden standard
established in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992), explicitly requires the balancing of competing interests. According to the Casey
joint opinion: "The very notion that the State has a substantial interest in potential life
leads to the conclusion that not all regulations must be deemed unwarranted. Not all
burdens on the right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy will be undue." Id. at
876. The Roe Court itself warned: "The privacy right involved.., cannot be said to be
absolute." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
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to criminal justice and women's interests. This Article advocates re-
structuring the debate to gauge the fairness and utility of the statutes in
targeting pregnancy violence, independent of their position on fetal
personhood. It concludes that, under such an analysis, many of the laws
currently suffer from serious defects.
Feminists may find fault with the stereotypical assumptions about
women that are embodied in fetal homicide legislation. 233 But they also
ought to be concerned that the statutes often do not provide adequate
protection for defendants' rights. This latter type of critique is more often
associated with liberals and civil libertarians who do not necessarily pursue
feminist goals. Yet, in the final analysis, the campaign against intimate
violence, including violence against pregnant women, will be stronger and
more compelling if it also strives to uphold the substantive and procedural
rights of the (predominantly male) defendants accused of such crimes.234
A. The Unfulfilled Goals of Deterrence and Retribution
Many of the fetal homicide laws, as drafted, are ineffective and unjust
tools for combatting pregnancy violence. First, analysis of state criminal
codes reveals a bias toward punishing homicide, rather than preventing non-
lethal attacks on pregnant women from occurring and escalating. While at
least thirty-three states have some kind of statutory or judge-made fetal
homicide law, only fourteen states provide for the prosecution of fetal
assault, and twenty states allow offenders to be charged with a crime such as
battery of a pregnant woman.235 The remaining criminal codes thus
participate in a long historical tradition of imposing harsh punishments for
233 See infra text accompanying notes 286-87.
234 A student writer complains, for example:
The need for critical examination of the legislative and judicial responses to
domestic violence and their effect on defendants' rights is acute. Indeed, while the
volume of literature concerned with documenting the enormity of the problem and
suggesting an assortment of curative measures has markedly increased in the past
decade, academic analysis of the impact these measures have on the domestic
violent defendant is virtually nonexistent. What commentary has emerged has been
mostly the work of students.
Comment, Criminal Protection Orders in Domestic Violence Cases: Getting Rid of Rats
with Snakes, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 919, 920 (1996). A similar need for balance exists in
the context of rape law reform. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Forcible Rape, Date Rape,
and Communicative Sexuality: A Legal Perspective, in DATE RAPE: FEMINISM,
PHILOSOPHY, AND THE LAW 51, 60-61 (Leslie Francis, ed., 1996) (questioning how a
reformed rape standard can be fair to male defendants if it only embodies a woman's
conception of reasonableness).
235 Database maintained by the author.
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murder without deterring intimate-partner abuse before it escalates to that
level.2
36
Second, the statutes may actually exacerbate the problem of
underreporting. Some women who miscarry after an episode of intimate
violence will not report the death of their fetuses due to fear that their abusers
will be prosecuted for murder. This fear may stem from a desire to protect
the abuser,237 as well as from economic dependence upon him. 238 A battered
woman may also worry about violent reprisals if the abuser is released. 239
However, any type of prosecutorial approach to domestic violence could
backfire because the victim perceives disincentives to going to the police;
this dilemma is not unique to the fetal homicide schemes discussed in this
Article. Indeed, it is unclear that criminalizing "pregnancy battering" or
using sentence enhancements in lieu of fetal homicide laws240 would
appreciably lessen the problem of underreporting. Punitive approaches to
pregnancy violence cannot stand by themselves. Rather, they must be paired
236 See Ramsey, Intimate Homicide, supra note 205, at 165.
237 Some victims of intimate violence continue to feel love for their batterers. See
Deborah Epstein, Margret E. Bell, & Lisa A. Goodman, Transforming Aggressive
Prosecution Policies: Prioritizing Victims' Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution of
Domestic Violence Cases, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 465, 479 (2003); see
also Sarah M. Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, a.k.a. Why Abuse Victims Stay, COLO.
LAW., Oct. 1999, at 22 ("A victim may say she still loves the perpetrator, although she
definitely wants the violence to stop.").
238 See Buel, supra note 237, at 20; Epstein, Bell, & Goodman, supra note 237, at
477. Cf Ramsey, Intimate Homicide, supra note 205, at 171 (stating that, in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, women were reluctant to report intimate abuse
because they feared that their families would experience terrible economic hardship if
their husbands were imprisoned for assault or attempted murder).
239 See Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State's Response to
Domestic Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1843, 1868 (2002); see also Epstein, Bell,
& Goodman, supra note 237, at 476 (noting that victims in one study said "fear of the
batterer" was "the number one reason they were unwilling to cooperate with the
government"). A recent sociological study shows that one in five women whose intimate
partners were arrested for a domestic violence-related crime experienced another attack
by the assailant after arrest but before the case closed. See Ruth E. Fleury-Steiner,
Deborah I. Bybee, Cris M. Sullivan, Joanne Belknap, & Heather C. Melton, Contextual
Factors Impacting Battered Women's Intentions to Re-Use the Criminal Legal System, 34
J. OF COMM. PSYCHOL. 327 (2006). The women told interviewers that, as a result of this
retaliatory violence, they would be less likely to involve the criminal justice system if the
abuse continued. See id. Furthermore, as many as a third of the interviewees said that
they had been assaulted by their assailants six months to one year after their cases closed.
See id.
240 See supra text accompanying note 129 (discussing the proposals of Tuerkheimer
and others); supra note 130 (discussing federal sentencing enhancement provisions that
existed prior to the UVVA).
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with a web of preventive services that include fully funded battered women's
shelters, legal and non-legal advocacy services, mental health support, job
training, and education, as well as the enforcement of protection orders.241
The dubious deterrent value of the fetal homicide statutes in the absence
of a broader safety net for battered women is all the more remarkable
considering that many of the statutes cannot be defended on retributive
grounds. The most famous fetal homicide case-that of Scott Peterson-was
rather atypical. The Peterson case involved a defendant who clearly knew
that his wife was eight months pregnant when he killed her. 242 Indeed, it is
commonly believed that Peterson committed the instrumental murder of his
wife, Laci, and their unborn son, Conner, so that he could romance his
mistress, Amber Frey.243 The facts of this case thus fit the cultural
assumption that fetal homicide statutes target abusive men who fail to protect
their wives and children. Peterson was depicted as a moral monster that
knowingly killed his own offspring. One of the jurors who found him guilty
of two counts of murder stated: "Scott Peterson was Laci's husband,
Conner's daddy-the one person who should have protected them .... For
me a big part of it was at the end-the verdict-no emotion. No anything.
That spoke a thousand words-loud and clear." 244
241 See Epstein, Bell, & Goodman, supra note 237, at 486-92; Epstein, supra note
239, at 1890-92; Jane Murphy, Engaging with the State: The Growing Reliance on
Lawyers and Judges to Protect Battered Women, 11 AM. U.J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L.
499, 514 (2003).
242 The House Report on the UVVA ("Laci and Conner's Law") reports that Scott
Peterson and his wife "had learned that they were having a boy and had named their son
Conner." H.R. REP. No. 108-420, pt. 1, at 8 (2004).
243 See Dean E. Murphy, Jury Says Scott Peterson Deserves to Die for Murder, N.
Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at A20 (reporting that evidence about defendant's affair with
another woman "in the weeks leading up to Laci Peterson's disappearance" not only
turned his hometown against him, but also constituted "a big piece of the puzzle" at trial).
A letter to USA Today accused Peterson of killing his wife and unborn child because "he
was selfish and was always looking for greener pastures." Letter to the Editor, Jurors Do
'The Right Thing' in Urging Death for Scott Peterson, USA TODAY, Dec. 17, 2004, at
14A, available at 2004 WLNR 14277048.
244 What Makes the Death Penalty OK?, GREEN BAY PREsS-GAZErT'E, Dec. 15,
2004, at 6A; see also Mark Sappenfield, Growing Role of Emotion in Jury Verdicts,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 15, 2004, at 2, available at 2004 WLNR 14015441
("[T]ime and again, several [jurors] have returned to one crucial point: Throughout the
trial, Peterson never showed the slightest hint of grief, remorse, or sadness."). Despite the
jury's belief that he richly deserved capital punishment, Peterson will be an anomaly on
death row, which is mostly populated by cop killers, serial killers, and those convicted of
committing murders during other violent crimes. See Ramsey, Intimate Homicide, supra
note 205, at 143 & n.220 (citing Elizabeth Rapaport, Capital Murder and the Domestic
Discount: A Study of Capital Domestic Murder in the post-Furman Era, 49 SMU L. REV.
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However, many fetal homicide statutes go beyond the paradigm of a man
who attacks his wife or girlfriend with full knowledge that she is carrying a
fetus. During jury selection in the Peterson case, for example, the California
Supreme Court held, in People v. Taylor, that a defendant could be convicted
of second-degree murder for killing a fetus without evidence that he knew
the woman he assaulted was pregnant.245 The legal doctrine at issue in
Taylor was implied malice. 246 But transferred intent and the felony murder
rule also allow fetal murder convictions. Ironically, the medical visibility of
the fetus via ultrasound and other technologies of prenatal care247 encroaches
the rights of a class of individuals to whom the unborn may be totally
invisible-third-party attackers. An offender who assaults a pregnant
woman, or even commits a felony in her vicinity, runs the risk that,
unbeknownst to him, she is in the early stages of pregnancy. If the death of
her fetus results, the state is relieved of the burden of showing that he
intended to kill it or even that he was particularly indifferent to the value of
its life.
Paired with capital aggravators, such as the "multiple murders" provision
on the books in California and twelve other states that criminalize fetal
homicide,248 the implied malice, transferred intent, and felony murder
doctrines allow an individual to suffer the death penalty for killing a fetus
that he had no reason to know existed. In other circumstances, the state may
imprison him for life. 249 Such severe outcomes, without proof of a
1507, 1517 tbl.2 (1996)). Yet, interestingly, the outcome of his case harmonizes with an
older tradition, dating back to the nineteenth century, of executing men for domestic
murders. See id. at 101-03, 141, 144-56, 158 tbl.4, & apps. C & D (presenting research
on the severe treatment, including capital punishment, of men who killed their intimates
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries); see also Carolyn B. Ramsey, The
Discretionary Power of "Public" Prosecutors in Historical Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 1309, 1366-83 (2002) (suggesting that prosecutors and juries in late nineteenth
century New York were less reluctant to seek the death penalty for men who killed their
female intimates than for other types of murder defendants).
245 See People v. Taylor, 86 P.3d 881, 882 (Cal. 2004); see also Bob Egelko, Broad
Ruling on Murder of Fetus: Charge Can Apply Before Pregnancy Visible, Court Finds,
S.F. CHRON., Apr. 6, 2004, at B3, available at 2004 WLNR 7652297 (noting that this
ruling was issued during jury selection in the Peterson case).
246 See Taylor, 86 P.3d at 883.
247 See supra text accompanying notes 138-42.
248 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(3) (2006). Data on the twelve other states with
multiple murders provisions is available in a database maintained by the author.
249 For example, in People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 593 (Cal. 1994), the defendant
was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole after being found
guilty of murdering a fetus in the course of a felony, assault with a firearm, and robbery,
with the special circumstance that he personally used a firearm during the commission of
each offense. He received an additional five years in prison for use of the firearm. See id.
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sufficiently culpable mental state, offend both due process and
proportionality. As a general matter, due process requires that the prosecutor
prove mens rea for each material element of a serious, non-regulatory crime
and that no material element can be irrebuttably presumed.
250
Proportionality-an essentially retributive principle that has been undercut
from a variety of angles, including habitual offender laws25 I--demands that
the punishment not exceed the gravity of the offense. As explained below,
current approaches to fetal murder often violate both principles.
252
B. The Offender's Lack of Awareness of the Pregnancy
1. Implied Malice
In 1999, Harold Wayne Taylor fatally shot his former girlfriend, Patty
Fansler. Although Fansler was at least eleven weeks pregnant when he killed
her, Taylor was unaware of this fact. Not only did the defendant lack
subjective awareness of the existence of fetal life; 253 the examining
pathologist also reported that he "could not discern that Fansler, who
weighed approximately 200 pounds, was pregnant just by observing her on
the examination table."254 In other words, a reasonable person would not
have appreciated the risk that Fansler carried a fetus in her womb.
250 See Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at
Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 446, 460-63 (1985) (challenging the
felony murder rule on such grounds).
251 See David Schultz, No Joy in Mudville Tonight: The Impact of "Three Strike"
Laws on State and Federal Corrections Policy, Resources, and Crime Control, 9
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 557, 562-67 (2000) (summarizing the trend in Supreme
Court cases away from invalidating habitual offender statutes on proportionality
grounds). Justice Scalia has gone as far as suggesting that the Eighth Amendment does
not necessarily protect a right to proportional sentencing. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957, 985 (1991). However, this view is not widely shared. See Youngjae Lee, The
Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REv. 677, 679 n. 16 (2005)
(noting that Scalia and Thomas were the only Justices on the Rehnquist Court to question
the existence of a proportionality guarantee).
252 The imposition of vehicular manslaughter liability for individuals who cause the
death of a fetus during auto accidents raises a slightly different set of concerns, which this
article will not discuss.
253 Reversing Taylor's conviction, the California Court of Appeals noted, "There is
not an iota of evidence that [defendant] knew his conduct endangered fetal life." People
v. Taylor, 86 P.3d 881, 883 (Cal. 2004) (quoting the California Court of Appeals).
Although the California Supreme Court reversed this judgment, it did not disturb the
basic finding that Taylor lacked knowledge of Fansler's pregnancy.
254 Id.
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Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court held that, to obtain a second-
degree murder conviction under an implied malice theory, the prosecution
only had to show that the defendant engaged in inherently dangerous conduct
and that he did so with conscious disregard for life. The latter element-the
mental component-did not need to be demonstrated with regard to a
specific victim. 255 The prosecution was simply required to prove that Taylor
"acted with knowledge of the danger to and conscious disregard for life in
general. '256 The court accepted the Attorney General's hypothetical example
of a gunman who "walked down the hall of an apartment building and fired
through the closed doors"; the gunman "would be liable for the murder of all
victims struck by his bullets .... -257 Anyone in that building, or at least in
all apartments along that hall, would be in the zone of harm, whether the
gunman specifically knew of her presence or not.
The zone-of-harm theory does not apply as readily to pregnancy violence
as the Taylor court believed, however. A defendant is said to have implied
malice toward all persons in the vicinity of his primary victim; classic
examples include using a bomb or a hail of bullets to kill a single person. 258
Under a similar formulation, depraved heart murder, the defendant is deemed
indifferent to the value of human life when he engages in extremely
dangerous conduct, 259 such as firing his gun into a crowd or throwing rocks
from an overpass onto the busy highway below. Despite the Taylor court's
reasoning, these scenarios differ in important respects from a killer's attitude
toward a fetus whose presence is unknown to him.
In each scenario other than the fetal killing, the offender knows that he
potentially is using a deadly weapon on a multiplicity of people. When the
gunman fires indiscriminately through closed apartment doors, in the
hypothetical raised during the Taylor oral arguments, he knows that each
apartment might contain one or more occupants. Thus, even though he does
not select a specific victim, he knows that he may be placing many lives at
risk. According to Wayne LaFave, "[i]t is what the defendant should realize
to be the degree of risk, in light of the surrounding circumstances which he
knows, which is important, rather than the amount of risk as an abstract
proposition of the mathematics of chance. '260 By contrast, under the actual
facts of Taylor, the only person of whom the defendant reasonably was aware
255 See id. at 884-85.
256 ld. at 884.
257 ld.
258 See id. at 889 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (citing People v. Bland, 48 P.3d 1107
(Cal. 2002); see also Ford v. State, 625 A.2d 984, 1000 (Md. 1993).
259 Cf LAFAVE, supra note 190, at 572 (discussing depraved heart murder and
providing examples).
260 See id. at 571 (emphasis added).
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was his former girlfriend, Patty Fansler. Unless we assume that any woman's
body, like any apartment, may be occupied by one or more individuals
besides herself, Taylor did not display a conscious disregard of life in
general.261 States that apply the implied malice or depraved heart formulation
to accidental feticides authorize this unjust result.
2. Transferred Intent
In many states, fetal murder liability is premised on the legal fiction that
the defendant's intent to kill transfers from the mother to the fetus. The
typical fact pattern to which the transferred intent doctrine applies goes like
this: A intends to kill B. A shoots at B, but due to his poor aim, the bullet hits
and instead kills C, a visible bystander. A is found guilty of C's murder
because A's intent transfers from B to C. 262 Although a few theorists reject
the doctrine of transferred intent, 263 its paradigmatic application enjoys
widespread acceptance under Anglo-American law. 264 However, fetal
murder statutes that rely on transferred intent present nonstandard examples
in which punishing the defendant for murder seems unjust, or at least
dubious.
For instance, suppose that the defendant intends to kill a woman who is
not visibly pregnant, and he has no other knowledge of the fetus's existence.
If he fails to kill his intended target, but attacks her with such violence that
she miscarries or gives birth to a stillborn infant, imposing murder liability
for the inadvertent killing may violate ordinary notions of justice. Some
commentators have rejected the use of transferred intent in such a scenario,
where the offender did not even display negligence toward the actual
victim. 265 Others, like Douglas Husak, admit that the invisibility of the
victim makes for a hard case,266 but conclude that because the defendant
261 See Taylor, 86 P.3d at 889-90 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
262 See Douglas N. Husak, Transferred Intent, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 65, 65 (1996).
263 See id. at 69-71 (describing the views of "purists" who believe that A should be
convicted of the lesser offenses of manslaughter and attempted murder for killing C and
attempting to kill B). Others would convict A of murdering C on the ground that murder
does not require the intent to kill a specific human being. See DRESSLER, supra note 186,
at 109.
264 See id. at 107.
265 See Husak, supra note 262, at 81 (citing GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW:
THE GENERAL PART 133 (2d ed. 1961)).
266 See id.
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intended to kill someone, he and an intentional murderer are equally
culpable.267
The use of the transferred intent doctrine seems even more troubling
when the defendant kills the pregnant woman, as intended, in addition to
unintentionally killing the unborn. In a well-known fetal homicide case, Sean
Patrick Merrill allegedly shot Gail Anderson with intent to kill her.268
Although Anderson was pregnant with a twenty-seven- or twenty-eight-day-
old embryo of approximately four to five millimeters in length, the record did
not show that either Anderson or Merrill was aware of this fact at the time of
the assault.269 Nevertheless, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that
Merrill's intent to kill Anderson was transferable to the non-viable embryo
and thus that he could be charged with two murders. The fetal homicide
statute in question provided fair warning, according to the court, because
"[t]he possibility that a female homicide victim of childbearing age may be
pregnant is a possibility that an assaulter may not safely exclude. '270
In a similar case, Willis Bailey pled guilty to two counts of first-degree
murder for fatally stabbing his girlfriend and also causing the death of her
three-month-old fetus.271 Unlike Merrill, Bailey was aware of his adult
victim's pregnancy; however, the prosecution presented no evidence that he
deliberately killed her fetus.272 Punishing a defendant like Bailey for a
double first-degree murder violates the principle of proportionate sentencing
because he is less culpable than a killer who consciously desired to cause two
deaths.273 Greater injustice results in a case like Merrill where the defendant
does not know about the pregnancy of a woman he fatally assaults.
Nevertheless, the outcome of the Bailey case also pushed the boundaries of
the transferred intent doctrine by conflating awareness of fetal life with intent
to destroy it.
267 See id. at 94-95.
268 State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 323 (Minn. 1990).
269 See id. at 320.
270 Id. at 323.
271 See Bailey v. State, 191 S.W.3d 52, 53 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).
272 See id at 54.
273 See Husak, supra note 262, at 94; see also People v. Birreuta, 208 Cal. Rptr. 635,
639 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (reversing murder conviction of defendant for inadvertently
killing his wife immediately after he intentionally shot his neighbor to death), abrogated
by People v. Bland, 48 P.3d 1107, 1115 (Cal. 2002). The proportionality principle
explains the injustice of imposing murder liability for both the intentional and inadvertent
killings in a less artificial way than does the argument that killing the primary target
exhausts the defendant's intent. But see DRESSLER, supra note 186, at 108 (arguing that
the intent is "used up" by the first killing).
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3. The Felony Murder Rule
At least seventeen states make a defendant guilty of murder if he causes
the death of a fetus during the commission of or flight from an inherently
dangerous felony. In a few jurisdictions, such as South Dakota and Ohio,
killing the unborn must be the knowing 274 or purposeful 275 result of the
defendant's conduct. But in others, like California, the prosecutor "may
obtain a fetal murder conviction . . . without proving malice" or even
conscious risk-taking towards an invisible, pre-viable entity that is no bigger
than a peanut.276
The arguments for and against the felony murder doctrine are well-
known.277 Detractors contend that the state cannot deter unintended acts by
punishing them as murder and that, to devise an appropriately retributive
sentence, the culpability for the killing must be analyzed separately from the
culpability for the predicate felony.278 This Article does not seek to enter the
larger debate about felony murder, for indeed, there is little new ground to
cover. However, it does suggest that the application of this doctrine to the
killing of pre-viable fetuses will have irrational and unjust results.
In People v. Davis, an armed robber was convicted of murdering his
pregnant victim's fetus 279 even though the jury found that he could not
reasonably have known that the twenty-three or twenty-five-week-old fetus
existed. 280 This was because the pregnant woman in this case, as in Taylor,
was heavy-set. 281 Moreover, the California Supreme Court held in Davis that
the murder statute applied to any unborn, human offspring at least seven or
eight weeks after fertilization, regardless of viability. 282 At least thirteen
274 South Dakota makes it a crime, defined as "fetal homicide," for a person to cause
the death of a fetus "if the person knew, or reasonably should have known, that a woman
bearing an unborn child was pregnant." S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-1.1 (Supp. 2006).
275 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.01(b) (West Supp. 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 22-16-1.1 (Supp. 2006).
276 People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 616 (Cal. 1994) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
277 See Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 59, 60 n. 1 (2004) (collecting scholarly critiques); see also id. at 208 (arguing that
"we have inherited from our nineteenth-century forebears a defensible tradition of
aggravating liability for culpable homicides committed in the pursuit of depraved
motives").
278 See, e.g., Roth & Sundby, supra note 250, at 451, 454-59.
279 See Davis, 872 P.2d at 593.
280 See id at 616 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
281 See id. at 615 (Mosk J., dissenting).
2 8 2 See id. at 600 n.2.
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states that allow fetal murder convictions under a felony murder theory do so
before the fetus has a chance of living outside the womb.283
The lengths to which prosecutors might push such laws are troubling.
Although the Davis opinion did not discuss the applicability of the felony
murder rule when "the death of the fetus is caused by some agency other than
a defendant's direct assault on the mother,"284 the outcome would be the
same. If a female robbery victim whose early pregnancy was not evident died
of a heart attack precipitated by the terror of being robbed at gunpoint285 and
lost her fetus, as well as her own life, the robber could be convicted of two
first-degree murders. This would be true simply because he used the gun as a
threat, regardless of whether he intended to fire it at anyone.
When applied to fetal homicide, the implied malice and transferred intent
doctrines at least have the virtue of targeting deaths that arise from extreme
violence. By contrast, the generalized risk of death posed by the defendant's
conduct may be much less in the context of felony murder. Hence, the
application of the felony murder rule to fetal homicide cases has the potential
to result in severe punishments for accidental killings that bear no relation to
the goal of punishing pregnancy violence.
Laws that do not require that the defendant was subjectively aware of the
pregnancy stretch to the breaking point general principles making intent, or
at least extreme risk-taking, a material element of murder. They also
stereotype women in an unacceptable way. The cases discussed above
announce that an individual who engages in dangerous behavior runs the risk
that any woman he victimizes may be pregnant. On its face, this
announcement may seem to make society safer by providing an additional
deterrent to the felon's harmful behavior. But on closer scrutiny, it reduces
women to a common denominator-their presumed ability to bear children.
Thus, in an insidious way, a substantial number of fetal homicide laws
participate in the social construction of what it means to be female-linking
the sex of the only visible victim to her supposed biological destiny, without
taking into account her fertility or the social choices she has made.
Legislative history clearly demonstrates that some lawmakers behind
fetal homicide legislation hold this stereotypical view of women. For
example, in the debate over the passage of Kentucky's fetal homicide laws,
one state senator rationalized the application of the transferred intent doctrine
to the killing of a pre-viable fetus by arguing that an offender "must presume
283 Database maintained by the author.
284 Davis, 872 P.2d at 600 n.2.
285 See People v. Stamp, 82 Cal. Rptr. 598 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (upholding felony
murder conviction for the death of an obese man with a history of heart disease, who died
of cardiac arrest during an armed robbery).
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the fertile octogenarian rule."286 According to Senator Williams, one should
not inflict violence on women "because they might be pregnant. '287 This
statement ties the value of women's lives, and the right not to suffer pain, to
child-bearing and, correspondingly, punishes assailants for failing to make a
stereotypical assumption about their victims' maternal roles.
C. Re-Discovering Knowledge and Causation
1. Knowledge of Pregnancy
Prosecution under fetal homicide laws does not always strain basic
principles of criminal justice. Indeed, such statutes have been used in an
appropriate manner to charge defendants who intentionally attacked a woman
they knew to be pregnant. For example, Barry Holcomb threw his girlfriend,
Laura Vaughn, against a fireplace, threatening to kill both her and her
fetus. 288 Tragically, Vaughn continued to associate with Holcomb, who
finally murdered her when the fetus had reached the gestational age of
twenty-six to twenty-eight weeks. 289 The State's evidence indicated that
Holcomb premeditated the killings and that he felt no remorse.290 He was
convicted of two counts of first-degree murder.291 Similarly, the defendant in
State v. MacGuire "learned, several days prior to the murder, that [his ex-
wife] Ms. MacGuire was engaged and expecting a baby." 292 After
confirming this information with a phone call to his former father-in-law, he
walked into his ex-wife's workplace and shot her four times, killing both her
and her fetus.293 Finally, in the gruesome California case that prompted the
amendment of the California Penal Code section 187 to include fetal victims,
Robert Keeler accosted his estranged wife on a rural road, verified that she
was pregnant, and then carried out his threat to "stomp" the fetus out of her
belly.294 Keeler's ex-wife subsequently delivered a stillborn baby.295
286 Video: Kentucky General Assembly Live, Hearing on H.B. 108 Before the
Judiciary Committee, 2004 Leg., 2004 Regular Session (Ky. 2004), available at
http://www.ket.org/legislature/archives.php?session=wgaos+005 (select Feb. 12 Senate
Judiciary hyperlink) (statement of Sen. Williams).
287 Id.
288 State v. Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
2 8 9 Id.
290 ld.
291 Id. at 289.
292 State v. MacGuire, 84 P.3d 1171, 1173 (Utah 2004).
293 See id.
294 See Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 618 (Cal. 1970).
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Although battered women's advocates often emphasize that pregnancy
violence is intended to "cause physical and emotional injury to the woman
and establish undeniably ... [the batterer's] power to control her," 296 some
men do exhibit express malice toward the fetal victim. One goal in such
cases seems to be the elimination of a future child. In Arkansas, Erik James
Bullock hired three men to beat his girlfriend so severely that she miscarried
her nine-month-old fetus; the court found that he did not want to shoulder the
obligations of paternity.297 A California man killed his best friend's pregnant
wife to rid the friend "of the encumbrance of a wife and a child so ... [h]e
could pursue a ministerial career." 298 These killings appear to have been
instrumental, rather than expressive of a desire to inflict pain on the pregnant
woman.
This Article contends that intent to kill a fetus or at least knowledge of its
existence, accompanied by extremely reckless behavior, ought to be requisite
to fetal murder liability. States can easily satisfy fairness and proportionality
concerns by including knowledge of pregnancy as a material element of their
murder statutes, as Illinois has done.299 This Article has also indicated some
discomfort with the basic concept of felony murder. Yet, despite the oft-
described flaws of the felony murder doctrine, no additional injustice occurs
when it is applied to an individual who perpetrates a dangerous felony with
subjective awareness that a pregnant woman is in the zone of harm. The
Davis dissenting opinion correctly distinguished that case from People v.
Henderson,300 in which the defendant "must have been well aware" that his
female victim, with whom he had resided for six weeks, was carrying a late-
term fetus when he robbed and strangled her.301 Viewed in this light, the four
states that allow a defendant to be convicted of felony murder only if the
fetus was viable at the time of the offense erect fewer impediments to fair
process because, after viability, the attacker is more likely to be aware of the
pregnancy. 302
295 See id. Because the legislature had not made clear that the state homicide statute
applied to the unborn, Keeler could not be convicted of murder. See id.
2 96 See Hearing on H.R. 1997, supra note 17.
297 See Bullock v. State, 111 S.W.3d 380, 382 (Ark. 2003).
298 People v. Smith, 234 Cal. Rptr. 142, 152 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
2 9 9 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1.2(a)(3) (2005).
300 275 Cal. Rptr. 837 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
301 People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 617 (Cal. 1994) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
302 Those states are Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, and Tennessee. FLA.
STAT. §§ 782.09(l)(a), 782.09(5) (2005); Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324
(Mass. 1984); State v. Home, 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-
202, 39-13-214(a) (West 2003).
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2. Cause of Death
Giving the state an incentive not to prosecute early-term fetal deaths as
murder, due to the difficulty of proving mens rea, might have the additional
benefit of reducing doubt about causation. Total strangers are unlikely to
know that a woman is carrying a fetus until it reaches a fairly advanced stage
of development. Similarly, while intimate partners may attack their female
victims in the early term, reports indicate that such violence more often
occurs later. 30 3 Proof of causation also bears some relation to fetal age. In the
first trimester, it is often difficult to determine whether the fetus died from
injuries that the defendant inflicted or was spontaneously aborted due to
genetic defects, uterine abnormalities, substance abuse, or other toxic
exposure. 304
This Article has shown that imposing murder liability on a third party
who kills a pre-viable fetus involves no inherent conflict with the Supreme
Court's abortion jurisprudence. Viability does not automatically constitute a
bright line for assessing the state's interest in fetal life, outside the context of
a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy. 305 Nevertheless, forcing the
prosecutor to prove both knowledge of the pregnancy and causation of death
beyond a reasonable doubt would reduce the number of murder cases brought
against defendants who allegedly killed early-term fetuses.
V. CONCLUSION
The politics of the abortion debate have impeded rational discussion of
solutions to the problem of violence against pregnant women. The pro-life
camp's persistent refrain that abortion is murder ignores contextual
understandings of homicide that resonate in American law and culture. Many
ordinary Americans who think that the violent, nonconsensual termination of
a pregnancy should be considered a criminal homicide also support Roe v.
Wade. Far from being inconsistent, their views can be justified by legal
principles.
By agreeing to do battle on the anti-abortionists' turf-a rhetorical space
in which the fetus's status as a person or non-person is believed to determine
the legality of abortion-the pro-choice camp also misplaces its emphasis.
Instead, pro-choicers ought to insist that there are significant differences
between a woman who makes an autonomous decision to continue, or to
303 See Gelles, supra note 117, at 844 (stating that women are more likely to
experience violence during the second half of their pregnancies); Roan, supra note 120 at
El (reporting similar patterns).
304 See Davis, 872 P.2d at 620 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
305 See supra Part III.C.3.
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terminate, her pregnancy and an anti-social actor who violently wrests that
decisional power from her. Clearing the smoke of the abortion battle from the
field allows for reasoned analysis of the fetal homicide laws. Despite
receiving support from implacable foes of reproductive rights, most of these
statutes contain provisions that keep them in line with the Supreme Court's
abortion jurisprudence.
Nevertheless, their drafting reveals sloppy thinking about the challenges
of preventing intimate violence and disregard for basic principles of fairness
to defendants. The chief failing of the fetal murder statutes inheres in their
approach to mens rea. Ignoring the invisibility of a pre-viable fetus to many
offenders, as well as the undesirability of stereotyping all female victims as
potentially pregnant, the laws assign murder liability to killings that show
neither criminal intent nor culpable indifference to fetal life.
Pro-choice advocates appear callous when they insist that the unborn can
never be murdered; pragmatically, such an approach may alienate "abortion
gray" voters over an issue that does not seriously threaten Roe. However,
those concerned about the fair administration of the criminal law, and
particularly the fit between offense definitions and punishment goals, have
grounds to urge the legislatures that passed many of the fetal murder statutes
to go back to the drawing board and start again.
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